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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
A. E., INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Appellate No. 2000502-SC
Plaint.i t t/ Appall, .in t,
Priority 15

vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION;
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT
COUNTY ASSESSOR; and SUMMIT
COUNTY TREASURER,
Defendant/Appellee.

ADDENDUM

1,

Residential exemption, § 59-2-103, UCA, Part 1,

2,

Other exemptions, § 59-2-1101, UCA, Part 11.

3,

Payment under protest. Letters, 1 99^ • 96 .

4,

Payment under protest, Statute § 59-2-1327, UCA.

5,

Summit County Resolution providing for refunds for 1987-91,
dated June 9, 1992.
A. E., Inc.'s primary residence
form, dated February 3, 1997.

aavit" on Summit County

7.

Summit County grants primary residency status to A. E., Inc.,
April 17, 1997.

8.

A. E., Inc.'s refund request to Summit County for 1992-1996
overpayment of taxes, dated April 24, 1997. (Beginning of
administrative action.)

9.

Summit County denies refund, August 14, 1997.

10

Summit County Ordinance 3 1 9 reau i r
1997.
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13.
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1999.
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17.

A. E., Inc.'s Complaint filed in Summit County District
Court, December 22, 1999.

18.

Transcript of hearing on cross-motions
judgment held April 17, 2000.
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PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
59-2-1(11

Slicii: t title.

This chapter is known as the ' I )vj •* * ' • "• * ,:' ' I a x ^ ct "
History: C. 1953, 59 2 101, enacted b
1987, ch. 4, § 48.
Tax Elimination Committee. — Laws
1996, ch. 315, §§ 1 to 4 establish the Tax
Elimination Blue Ribbon Committee, consisting of seven members each of the House and
Senate. The committee is to "develop a plan to

59-2-102.

eliminate or provide for a substantial reduction
in state and local government reliance on the
property tax" and report its plan to the Revenue
and Taxation Interim Committee before December 31,1996. Section 9 of the act repeals the
act on December 31, 1996.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter and title:
(1) "Aerial applicator" means aircraft or rotorcraft used exclusively for
the purpose of engaging in dispensing activities directly affecting agriculture or horticulture with an airworthiness certificate from the Federal
Aviation Administration certifying the aircraft or rotorcraft's use for
agricultural and pest control purposes.
(2) "Air charter service" means an air carrier operation which requires
the customer to hire an entire aircraft rather than book passage in
whatever capacity is available on a scheduled trip.
(3) "Air contract service" means an air carrier operation available only
to customers who engage the services of the carrier through a contractual
agreement and excess capacity on any trip and is not available to the
public at large.
(4) "Airline" means any air carrier operating interstate routes on a
scheduled basis which offers to fly passengers or cargo on the basis of
available capacity on regularly scheduled routes.
(5) "Assessment roll" means a permanent record of the assessment of
property as assessed by the county assessor and the commission and may
be maintained manually or as a computerized file as a consolidated record
or as multiple records by type, classification, or categories.
(6) "Certified revenue levy" means a property tax levy that provides the
same amount of ad valorem property tax revenue as was collected for the
prior year, plus new growth, but exclusive of revenue from collections from
redemptions, interest, and penalties.
(7) (a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land,
or any improvements to the property, subject to taxation and is:
(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the
incorrect parcel, or assessed to the wrong taxpayer \ •:•>
assessing authority;
(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the
failure of the taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements
of this chapter; or
(hi) undervalued because of errors made by the assessing
authority based upon incomplete or erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer.
58
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rolls'" in Subsection (5,)(a)(ii) (now Subsection
(6)(a)(iij).

The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995,
added Subsection (6) and redesignated the following subsections accordingly.
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996,
in the definition of "public utility," deleted "common carrier'' from the list of entities in the first
sentence and deleted "warehousemen" from the
exception in the second sentence.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1990, ch.
212, which amended the definition of "fair mar-

59-2-103

ket value,'" provides in § 45 that if any provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the act is to be given
effect without the invalid provision or application.
Retrospective Operation,
Laws 1995,
ch. 271, § 21 provides that this section has
retrospective operation to January 1, 1995.
Cross-References. — Railroad rolling stock
as personalty, Utah Const., Art. XII, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Escaped property.
Fair market value.
Improvement.
Real estate.
Cited.
Escaped property.
Property that received a tax exemption due
to a mistake by the county was not "escaped
property" under the statutory definition, thus
preventing the county from retroactively assessing additional taxes on the property. First
Sec. Mtg. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 866 P.2d
1250 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Fair market value.
A stock purchaser is generally not a "knowledgeable buyer" as required by the definition of
"fair market value" in this section. Utah Ass'n
of Counties v. Tax Comm'n ex rel. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 895 P.2d 825 (Utah 1995).
Improvement.
The test of whether property is an "improve-

ment" to real property for tax purposes is
whether it is "erected upon or affixed to the
land." Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d
961 (Utah 1996).
It is clear from the wording of Subsection (12)
that the legislature contemplated that improvements might be made to property in
which types of interest other than title may be
held and since the legislature did not specifically exclude "leased property" from those
nontitle lands, improvements to leased property are included in this definition. Crossroads
Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 P2d 961 (Utah 1996).
Real estate.
An engine and boiler built into a brick foundation and firmly affixed by bolts leaded down
and used in underground workings of a mine
are included in term "real estate." Mammoth
Mining Co. v. Juab County, 10 Utah 232, 37 P.
348 (1894).
Cited in Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1993); Utah
Ass'n of Counties v. Tax Comm'n ex rel. AT & T
Co., 895 P.2d 819 (Utah 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Software
Taxation: A Critical Reevaluation of the Notion
of Intangibility, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 859.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and
Local Taxation §§ 1, 2.

59-2-103

C.J.S. 8 4 C.J.S. Taxation § 66.
Key Numbers. — Taxation ®== 58.

'Rate of assessment of property — Residential
property.

(1) All tangible taxable pi operty shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform
and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1,
unless otherwise provided by law.
(2) Beginning January 1,1995, the fair market value of residential property
shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential exemption allowed under
Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution.

59-2-103
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(3) No more than one acre of land per residential unit may qualify for the
residential exemption
History: C. 1953, 59-2-103, enacted by L.
1987, ch*4, § 50; 1988, ch. 3, § 91; 1991, ch.
263, § 3;1994,ch.310,§ 2; 1995, ch. 275, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective January 1, 1994, in Subsection
(2), substituted "January 1, 1994" for "January
1, 1991." deleted "until December 31, 1991, the
fair market value of residential property shall
be reduced by 29.159c, and beginning January
1, 1992, and every year thereafter" before "the
fair market," and substituted "329cr for
"29.507c."
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995,
in Subsection (2), substituted "1995" for "1994,"
substituted " 4 5 ^ " for "32%," and made a stylistic change.
Property Tax Task Force. - Laws 1995,
ch. 162, § 1 creates the Property Tax Task
Force, to consist of thirteen legislators; the task
force has essentially the same composition and

duties as the task force created by former §
59-2-106, enacted in 1994 and repealed in 1995.
The task force is to "address issues facing the
property tax system including: (a) appraisal of
property; (b) measurement of assessment quality; (c) factoring and other methods of valuation
adjustments; (d) property tax exemptions; and
(e) certified rate calculations." The task force is
to report to the Revenue and Taxation Interim
Committee on or before the December 1995
interim committee meeting. It will be funded by
a $41,500 appropriation from the General
Fund. Section 5 of the act repeals the act on
December 31, 1995.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Constitutional taxation provisions generally, Utah Const., Art.
XIII.
Indians' property, Utah Const., Art. Ill, § 2.
Nonresident citizens, taxation, Utah Const.,
Art. Ill, § 2.
DlvMHO.VS

ANALYSIS

Building restrictions and easements.
Burden of proof.
County assessor to appraise property.
Exemptions.
Improvements.
Judicial interference.
Nonresidents' property.
Priorities.
Remedies of taxpayer against assessment.
State-owned land.
Taxing power.
Tax rates.
Unity of use doctrine.
Words and phrases defined.

state. The authority of the State Tax Commission over local assessments is a general supervisory one and the commission should not intervene to take over or interfere with the duty
of the assessors except in unusual circumstances. University Heights, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 196, 364 P.2d 661 (1961).

\

Exemptions.
•;
In order to relieve any species of property
from its due and just proportion of burdens of
government, language relied on as creating
exemption from taxation should be so clear as
not to admit of reasonable controversy about its
meaning, since all doubts must be resolved
against exemption. Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah
242, 48 P. 1097 (1897,).,

Building restrictions and e a s e m e n t s .
To assess property without regard to a building restriction or an easement would be to
assess it without regard to the nature and
extent of the property interest which the assessed owner has in the land, in complete
disregard of its fair cash value which would be
in violation of this section. Hayes v. Gibbs, 110
Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781, 168 A.L.R. 513 (1946)
(prior to "fair market" standard).

Improvements.
Assessment for certain year of improvements
not complete on first day of such year was
proper since all property, although in course of
construction, if it possesses value, should be
assessed at its cash value. Union Portland
Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 64 Utah 335,
230 P. 1020 (1924; (decided prior to "fair market" standard).

Burden of proof.
Burden to show inequality of assessment is
on taxpayer. First Nat'l Bank v. Christensen, 39
Utah 568, 118 P. 778 (1911).

Judicial interference.
Unless tax laws conflict with some constitutional provision, either expressly or by implication, courts have no authority to prevent their
execution. Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah
368, 57 P. 1 (1899).

County a s s e s s o r t o a p p r a i s e p r o p e r t y ,
It is the duty of the county assessors to make
appraisal of all of the individual property in the

Nonresidents' property.
As against contention of foreign corporation
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that taxation of its refrigerator cars in Utah
was forbidden by U.S. Constitution because
such cars had no situs in Utah for purpose of
taxation and tax on them would impose burden
on interstate commerce, held that cars were
taxable in Utah on basis of average number
thereof used and employed by their owner in
Utah during year for which assessment was
made. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch,
177 U.S. 149, 20 S. Ct. 631, 44 L. Ed. 708
(1900).
Property brought into state even temporarily
by nonresident corporation is taxable in county
where used or located. Hamilton & Gleason Co.
v. Emery County, 75 Utah 406, 285 P. 1006
(1930).
Priorities.
Taxes for general governmental purposes are
paramount to all other demands against property to which tax lien attaches. Ingraham v.
Hanson, 297 U.S. 378, 56 S. Ct. 511, 80 L. Ed.
728 (1936).
Remedies of taxpayer against assessment.
Those whose property is intentionally assessed at higher percentage or valuation than
was placed on general mass of taxable property
in county may invoke aid of courts to compel
taxing officers to reduce excessive assessment
so made to same proportion of value as was
placed upon general mass of other taxable
property in county. First Natl Bank v.
Christensen, 39 Utah 568, 118 P. 778 (1911).
State-owned land.
Where the state holds title to land in its
governmental capacity, the property is exempt
from taxation under the constitutional man-

59-2-104

date. Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n,
104 Utah 365, 140 R2d 335 (1943).
Taxing power.
State's power of taxation is not within application of or limited by Utah Const. Art. I, § 22,
the eminent domain provision. Kimball v.
Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1,45 L.R.A.
628 (1899).
The power to tax is purely a legislative function, and unless the Legislature has provided
for the taxation of the property, any attempt to
levy and assess a tax on the property is void.
Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Comm'n, 110
Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984 (1946).
Tax rates.
The fixing of tax rates is a legislative and not
a judicial function. Intermountain Title Guar.
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 107 Utah 222, 152
P.2d 724 (1944).
Unity of use doctrine.
The doctrine of unity of use for purpose of
determining assessment for taxation cannot be
applied to manufacturing or other similar
plants or industries which may be under common ownership, but used or operated in different states. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake
County, 60 Utah 491, 210 P. 106, 27 A.L.R. 874
(1922).
Words and phrases defined.
"Proportion,'' as used in first sentence of Utah
Const. Art. XIII, § 2, has reference to sameness
or likeness in value of property; that is, all
property must be taxed at same relative value.
State ex rel. Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah
86, 50 P. 615 (1897).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note: Property Tax Live for the Poor, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 193.
Assessment and the Utah Constitution — A
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and
Taxpayer's Dilemma, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 491.
Local Taxation § 191 et seq.; § 704 et seq.
Note, Financing Modernized and UnmodC.J.S. - 84 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 229, 361.
ernized Local Government in the Age of
A.L.R. — Judicial notice as to assessed valuAquarius, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 30.
ations, 42 A.L.R.3d 1439.
Housing in Salt Lake County — A Place to
Key Numbers. — Taxation s=> 4, 347.

59-2-104. Situs of property for tax purposes.
(1) The situs of all taxable property is the tax area where it is located.
(2) Personal property, unless assessed by the commission, shall be assessed
in the tax area where the owner is domiciled in this state on January 1, unless
the owner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the county assessor that the
personal property is usually kept in a tax area other than that of the domicile
of the owner, in which case that property shall be assessed in the other tax
area.
(3) Land shall be assessed in parcels or subdivisions not exceeding 640 acres
each, and tracts of land containing more than 640 acres, which have been
63
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59-2-201

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Article III, Sec. 2 of the Utah Constitution.
Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387 (Utah
1997).

Constitutionality.
The property tax exemption available only
for residential property used as a primary residence, the definition of "residential property" in
this section and 59-2-103(2), does not violate

Intangibles.
Customized computer software is considered
intangible property to be exempted from taxation. Cache County v. State Tax Comm'n, 922
P.2d 758 (Utah 1996).

Constitutionality.
Intangibles.

59-2-103. Rate of assessment of property — Residential
property.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Tax rates.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The residential property tax exemption in §
59-2-102 and this section does not violate Article III, Sec. 2 of the Utah Constitution. Dennis
v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387 (Utah 1997).
Tax rates.
County assessments are required to meet the
standards of uniformity and equality set forth
in the Utah Constitution and reflect fair market value pursuant to the Utah Code. If statements within the Commission's decisions impede the fulfillment of these constitutional and

statutory directives, the Commission's statements must be ignored. Alta Pac. Assocs. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d 103 (Utah
1997).
In determining an apartment buildings fair
market value, the Commission justifiably rejected the use of market rents and endorsed the
use of actual contract rents collected. Since the
subsidized apartments in this case were
treated no differently than other apartments,
no classification was made, and thus no constitutional violation occurred. Alta Pac. Assocs. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d 103 (Utah
1997).
Cited in Nelson v. Board of Equalization, 943
P.2d 1354 (Utah 1997).

PART 2
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY
59-2-201. Assessment by commission — Determination of
value of mining property — Notification of assessment — Local assessment of property assessed by the unitary method.
(1) By May 1 of each year the following property, unless otherwise exempt
under the Utah Constitution or under Part 11 of this chapter, shall be assessed
by the commission at 100# of fair market value, as valued on January 1, in
accordance with this chapter:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (2), all property which operates as
a unit across county lines, if the values must be apportioned among more
than one county or state;
(b) all property of public utilities;
(c^ all operating property of an airline, air charter service, and air
contract service;
(d^ all geothermal fluids and geothermal resources;
(e) all mines and mining claims except in cases, as determined by the
commission, where the mining claims are used for other than mining

Tab 2
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59-2-1011. Record of changes — Form and contents of
affidavit.
The county auditor shall make a record of all changes, corrections, and
orders and before October 15 shall affix an affidavit to the record, subscribed by
the auditor, in a form substantially as follows:
I
, do swear that, as county auditor of
county, I have
kept correct minutes of all acts of the county board of equalization
regarding alterations to the assessment rolls, that all alterations agreed to
or directed to be made have been made and entered on the rolls, and that
no changes or alterations have been made except those authorized by the
board or the commission.
History: C. 1953, 59-2-1011, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 3, § 144.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1988, ch. 3, § 144, repeals former § 59-2-1011,

as amended by Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 218,
relating to appeals from the county board or
commission, and enacts the present section,
effective February 9, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavits.
Duty to make record.
Affidavits.
Failure of auditor to attach his affidavit to
assessment rolls is a fatal defect. Telonis v.
Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P.2d 513 (1943).
Tax deed issued to county is invalid if county
auditor fails to affix his affidavit to assessment
rolls. Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166
R2d 239 (1946).
Tax title founded on assessment unsupported
by auditor's affidavits is fatally defective.
Sperry v. Tollev, 114 Utah 303, 199 P.2d 542
(1948).
Although failure to make or subscribe audi-

tor's affidavit will not affect validity of assessment, that affidavit is condition precedent to
valid tax deed from county. Jenkins v. Morgan,
113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948); Cooper v.
Carter Oil Co., 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P.2d 320
(1957).
Tax deed from a sale of property for delinquent taxes was void where year's assessment
roll did not have attached to it the auditor's
affidavit. Pender v. Jackson, 123 Utah 501, 260
P.2d 542 (1953).
Duty to make record.
Although sometimes the county clerk makes
a record of proceedings of board of equalization,
the county auditor is generally to make such
records. Board of Educ. v. Jeppson, 74 Utah
576, 280 P. 1065 (1929).

59-2-1012 to 59-2-1016. Repealed.
Repeals. - Laws 1988, ch. 3, § 268 repeals
§§ 59-2-1012 to 59-2-1016, as amended by
Laws 1987, ch. 4, §§ 141 to 145, relating to the
commission's decision on appeals, applications
and hearings on correction of assessments, in-

vestigations by the commission, and equalization of assessments, effective February 9, 1988.
For present provisions comparable to those in
former §§ 59-2-1012 to 59-2-1016, see §§ 59-21006 to 59-2-1010.

PART 11
EXEMPTIONS
Revision of Part — Laws 1988, ch. 3 revised this part, repealing provisions and reenacting
similar provisions in different sections, effectively renumbering most of the sections of this part
The table below shows the location in present Part 11, as revised by L. 1988, ch. 3, of sections
comparable to sections in former Part 11. as last amended by L. 1987, ch. 4.
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Former
Section
59-2-1102
59-2-1103
59-2-1104
59-2-1105
59-2-1106
59-2-1107

Corresponding
Section
59-2-1103
59-2-1104
59-2-1105
59-2-1106
59-2-1107
59-2-1108

Former
Section
59-2-1108
59-2-1109
59-2-1110
59-2-1111
59-2-1112
59-2-1113

59-2-1101
Corresponding
Section
59-2-1109
59-2-1110
59-2-1111
59-2-1112
59-2-1113
59-2-1114

59-2-1101. Exemption of property devoted to public, religious, or charitable uses — Proportional payments for government-owned property — Intangibles exempt — Affidavit required.
(1) The exemptions authorized by this part may be allowed only if the
claimant is the owner of the property as of January 1 of the year the exemption
is claimed, unless the claimant is a federal, state, or political subdivision entity
under Subsection (2)(a), (b), or (c), in which case the entity shall collect and pay
a proportional tax based upon the length of time that the property was not
owned by the entity.
(2) The following property is exempt from taxation:
(a) property exempt under the laws of the United States;
(b) property of the state, school districts, and public libraries;
(c) property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all other
political subdivisions of the state, except as provided in Title 11, Chapter
13, the Interlocal Cooperation Act;
(d) property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes;
(e) places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit;
(f) farm equipment and machinery; and
(g) intangible property.
(3) (a) The owner who receives exempt status for property, if required by
the commission, shall file an affidavit, on or before March 1 each year,
certifying the use to which the property has been placed during the past
year. The affidavit shall contain the following information in summary
form:
(i) identity of affiant;
(ii) the basis of the affiant's knowledge of the use of the property;
(iii) authority to make the affidavit on behalf of the owner;
(iv) county where property is located; and
(v) nature of use of the property,
(b) If the affidavit is not filed within the time limits prescribed by the
county board of equalization, the exempt status may, after notice and
hearing, be revoked and the property then placed on the tax rolls.
(4) The county legislative body may adopt rules to effectuate the exemptions
provided in this part.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2503; L.
1909,ch.94,§ 1;C.L.1917,§ 5863; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 80-2-1; 1986, ch. 57, § 2; C. 1953,
59-2-1; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 4, § 38;
1987, ch. 93, § 2; 1988, ch. 3, § 145; 1989, ch.

204, § 5; 1993, ch. 227, § 345.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted
"county legislative body" for "county governing
body" in Subsection (4).
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Cross-References. — Constitutional taxation provisions generally, Utah Const., Art.
XIII.
Exemptions:
Armories. § 39-2-1.
Constitutional exemptions, Utah Const., Art.
XIII. § 2.
Exemptions reserved to United States, Enabling Act. $ 3.

Fraternal insurance societies, § 31A-9-601.
Indians' property, Utah Const., Art. Ill, § 2.
Nonresident citizens, taxation, LTtah Const.,
Art. Ill, § 2.
Privilege tax on possession and use of taxexempt property, § 59-4-101.
School property generally, § 53A-3-408.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Charitable purposes.
Extent of exemption.
Federal property.
General construction.
Power of Legislature.
Public property.
Sale of electric power by city.
Sewer connection and service charges.
Utah State Retirement Fund property.
C h a r i t a b l e purposes.
Where fraternal order, purpose and object of
which was to promote good fellowship among
its members and for charitable purposes, conducted social club for benefit of members, and
part of clubroom was used as buffet where
liquors, meals and cigars were sold to members,
the net profits derived being devoted to charitable purposes, clubhouse was exempt from
taxation. Salt Lake Lodge No. 85 v. Groesbeck,
40 Utah 1, 120 P. 192, 1914C Ann. Cas. 940
(1911). But see Loyal Order of Moose, # 259 v.
County Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah
1982), overruling Groesbeck in part and holding that, but for true de minimis uses, the
constitutional exemption for charitable properties is to be strictly construed, and the charitable use must be exclusive.
In determining whether a hospital is entitled
to exemption from taxation under this section
on the ground that it is used exclusively for
"charitable purposes," the test is whether it is
maintained for the purpose of charity or for
profit, and if hospital is incorporated, the answer to that question depends upon its powers
as denned in its charter as well as upon the
manner in which it is conducted, and the corporation itself is concluded by the declaration of
its charter in respect to its purpose and object.
William Budge Mem. Hosp. v. Maughan, 79
Utah 516. 3 P.2d 258, rehearing denied, 79
Utah 529, 13 P.2d 1119 (1932).
Fraternal organization's lot and the lodge
building built thereon were not entitled to a tax
exemption on the basis of charitable use where
the activities conducted in the lodge consisted
chiefly of drinking, card playing, dancing, and
other social, rather than fraternal functions,
and the organization's expenditures on chari-

table objects amounted to only slightly more
than 2% of total expenditures. Baker v. One
Piece of Improved Real Property, 570 R2d 1023
(Utah 1977).
The State Tax Commission's charitable property tax exemption standards for nonprofit hospitals and nursing homes are constitutional
because they comply with factors previously
established in Utah County ex rel. County Bd.
of Equalization v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985), for granting a
charitable use property tax exemption. Howell
v. County Bd. ex rel. IHC Hosp., 881 P.2d 880
(Utah 1994).
Extent of exemption.
Exemption of property of benevolent society
extends only to such part of that property as is
occupied and used "exclusively" for charitable
purposes and not to part thereof held as source
of revenue, especially when value of each such
part of property is separately ascertainable.
Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961 (1901);
Salt Lake Lodge No. 85 v. Groesbeck, 40 Utah 1,
120 P. 192 (1911), overruled on other grounds,
Loyal Order of Moose, # 259 v. County Bd. of
Equalization, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982).
Where portion of certain property owned by
charitable institution was occupied and used by
it for charitable purposes, and other portion
thereof was rented to stores for purposes of
revenue, portion used and occupied for charitable purposes was exempt, and portion rented
out was subject to taxation. Odd Fellows' Bldg.
Ass'n v. Naylor, 53 Utah 111, 177 P. 214 (1918).
Federal property.
While taxes imposed by state law may not be
laid directly upon property or activities of federal government itself or of any of its instrumentalities, private property and interests may
be subjected to taxation under state law even
though they bear close relation to activities of
United States. Salt Lake County v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., 163 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1947),
cert, denied, 333 U.S. 832, 68 S. Ct. 458, 92 L.
Ed. 1116 (1948).
General construction.
In order to relieve any species of property
from its due and just proportion of burdens of
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o-overnment language relied on as creating
exemption from taxation should be so clear as
not to admit of reasonable controversy about its
meaning since all doubts must be resolved
against exemption Accordingly, court will not
aid or enlarge exemptions from taxation by
interpretation Judge v Spencer, 15 Utah 242,
48 P 1097 (1897)
Legislation, claimed to grant immunity from
taxation, will be strictly interpreted against
exemption Union Refrigerator Transit Co v
Lynch 18 Utah 378, 55 P 639 (1898), affd, 177
U S 149, 20 S Ct 631, 44 L Ed 708 (1900)
Power of L e g i s l a t u r e .
Legislature has no power to exempt from
taxation property not exempt therefrom under
Constitution Judge v Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48
P 1097 (1897;
Public p r o p e r t y .
Property owned by cities is absolutely exempt, and the exempt status of such property
depends upon no condition but ownership by
the city Spnngville v Johnson, 10 Utah 351,37
P 577(1894)
Where the state holds title to land in its
go\ ernmental capacity, the property is exempt
trom taxation under the constitutional mandate Duchesne County v State Tax Comm,
104 Utah 365, 140 P2d 335 (1943)
Where state accepted deed of land from defaulting mortgagor, rather than foreclose the
mortgage given upon purchase of the land from
the state, the state could not claim the land free
from county taxes levied while the mortgagor
had the title, since such would not be within

59-2-1102

listed exemption from taxation and would constitute an abatement of taxes State v Salt
Lake County, 96 Utah 464, 85 P2d 851 (1938),
State v Duchesne County, 96 Utah 482, 85 P2d
860 (1938)
Lands, title to which is acquired by the state
by foreclosure of mortgage or conveyance for
the extinguishment of a debt for money loaned
from the state school fund, are exempt from
taxation Duchesne County v State Tax
Comm , 104 Utah 365, 140 P2d 335 (1943)
Sale of electric p o w e r by city.
Sales tax on sales of electrical energy by
municipality does not offend Utah Const Art
XIII, § 2, because city may pass tax on to
consumer Even though city is required to pay
the tax, the tax may not be said to be a tax on
its property State Tax Comm v City of Logan,
88 Utah 406, 54 P2d 1197 (1936)
Sewer connection and service charges.
Charges by city levied against board of education for connections to city sewer system and
services thereof were mere payments for services enjoyed by the board and were not "taxes"
or "assessments" from which board was exempt Murray City v Board of Educ , 16 Utah
2d 115, 396 P2d 628 (1964)
Utah State Retirement Fund property.
Real property of the Utah State Retirement
Fund was "property of the state" within the
meaning of Utah Const, Art XIII, § 2, and was
therefore tax-exempt Utah State Retirement
Office v Salt Lake County, 780 P2d 813 (Utah
1989) (decided under former § 59-2-1)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — Note, Financing Modernized and Unmodernized Local Government
m the Age of Aquarius, 1971 Utah L Rev 30
Am. Jur. 2d. - 71 Am J u r 2d State and
Local Taxation §§ 191 et seq , 307 et seq
C.J.S. - 84 C J S Taxation §§ 282, 289 et
&eq
A.L.R. — Construction of statute or regulation exempting gifts to foreign charitable, educational or religious body on reciprocal basis, 12
ALR3d918
Garage or parking lot as within tax exemption extended to property of educational, charitable or hospital organizations, 33 A L R 3d
93£

Receipt of pay from beneficiaries as affecting
tax exemption of charitable institutions, 37
ALR3dll91
Exemption of parsonage or residence of minister, pnest, rabbi or other church personnel, 55
A L R 3d 356
Tax exemption for religious societies or institutions 28 A L R 4th 344
Exemption from real-propert} taxation of
residential facilities maintained b\ hospital for
patients, staff, or others, 61 A L R 4th 1105
Nursing homes as exempt from property
taxation 34 A L R 5th 529
Key Numbers. - Taxation o 241 to 244

59-2-1102. Determination of exemptions by board of
equalization — Appeal.
(1) The county board of equalization may, after giving notice in a manner
prescribed by rule, determine whether certain property withm the county is
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October 31,1996

rfflTJfTED MAIL

Glen C Thompson
Sumnrii County Treasurer
PO. Box 128
CJoajviDc UT 84017-0128
Re: Payment of 1996 Property Taxes Under Protest
Dear Mr. Thompson:
A-E^Inc, a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Qub at Deer
Valley. The corporation b sending you a check in the amount of $40^72.00 in payment of
the 1996 property taxes on the property known as Unit, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley
Utah. The account number is 0266118.
The corporation believes that 45 percent of the taxes assessed against this parcel are
unlawful and unconstitutional because the property has not been given the benefit of the
residential property tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the county
and state.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-1327,45 percent of the
total 1996 taxes due are paid under protest.
Sincerely,
A E., INC.
a Utah Corporanon
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59-2-1327

59-2-1327, Payment of tax under protest — Circumstances where authorized — Action to recover
tax paid.
Where a tax is demanded or enforced by a taxing entity, and the person
whose property is taxed claims the tax is unlawful, that person may pay the
tax under protest to the county treasurer. The person may then bring an action
in the district court against the officer or taxing entity to recover the tax or any
portion of the tax paid under protest.
History: C. 1953, 59-2-1327, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 3, § 184.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1988, ch. 3, § 184 repeals former § 59-2-1327,

as amended by L. 1987, ch. 4, § 205, relating to
the effect of the extension of the delinquency
date on subsequent proceedings, and enacts the
present section, effective February 9, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
edies were exhausted. Baker v. Tax Comm'n,
520 P.2d 203 (Utah 1974).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality of tax.
Construction and application.
Inheritance taxes.
Payment under protest not necessary.
Pleadings.
Proof.
Protest.
Right of recovery in general.
Standing.
Statute of limitations.
Suit against state in federal courts.
Void levy.
Constitutionality of tax.
The constitutionality or legality of the tax
statutes may be raised as issues in an action in
a district court after payment under protest or
in an action to enjoin collection. State Tax
Comm'n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979).
Construction and application.
In cases in which legality or illegality of tax
sought to be recovered by taxpayer necessarily
involves determination of questions of law calling for exercise of strictly judicial functions,
payment under protest and compliance with
other provisions of the statutes afford the exclusive remedy. Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 101
Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (1941).
Inheritance taxes.
Inheritance taxes paid under protest on
mongage bonds of Utah corporation, held by
nonresident citizen of foreign state at time of
death, were recoverable in action brought under this provision. McLaughlin v. Cluff, 66 Utah
245, 240 P. 161, 42 A.L.R. 347 (1925).
Payment under protest not necessary.
where owners were improperly taxed, it was
not necessary to pay under protest and be put
to expense of lawsuit until administrative rem-

Pleadings.
Complaint in action to recover taxes paid was
not subject to demurrer because it did not state
specifically why taxing officers had no authority
to levy and collect taxes. Salt Lake County v.
Utah Copper Co., 294 F. 199 (8th Cir. 1923),
cert, denied, 264 U.S. 590, 44 S. Ct. 403, 68 L.
Ed. 864 (1924), appeal dismissed, 267 U.S. 610,
45 S. Ct. 461, 69 L. Ed. 813 (1925).
Complaint, in action against county to recover illegal tax paid by plaintiff, which sets
forth portion of levy alleged to be unlawful,
demand for and receiving of illegal tax by duly
qualified treasurer and collector of defendant,
and plaintiffs payment of tax under protest
stated cause of action. Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab County, 22 Utah 395, 62 P. 1024
(1900).
To state a cause of action to recover back a
tax paid under protest, the complaint must
distinctly allege facts that render the tax illegal. Utah Metal & Tunnel Co. v. Groesbeck, 62
Utah 251, 219 P. 248 (1923).
Proof.
In action to recover illegal tax, paid under
protest, it was not necessary for plaintiff to
prove that tax was paid under duress. Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab County, 22
Utah 395, 62 P. 1024 (1900).
In action by cattle owner to recover taxes
paid under protest, in view of fact cattle were
not so located that assessor could count them,
by reason that they were scattered over vast
territory through hills and mountains and on
public domain, assessor was justified in availing himself of any reliable source of information
which to him seemed trustworthy. Nutter v.
Carbon County, 58 Utah 1, 196 P. 1009 (1921).
Protest.
Where officer is bound to take notice of his
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want of authoriU to assess, lew. or collect
certain tax, and tax is paid under protest,
statement in protest that demand is illegal
would be useless and is not required Centennial Euieka Mining Co \ Juab Count\. 22
Utah 395, 62 P 1024(1900)
No particular form of protest is required, nor
is it required that protest be in writing it is
sufficient if payments are made under oral
protest and noted b\ treasurer on tax records
Murdock v Murdock, 38 Utah 373 113 P 330
(1910).
Right of recovery in general.
Where tax w as found to be unlaw ful in matters as to which assessing officer had no discretion, party aggrieved was entitled to remedy
provided in former section Pmgree Natl Bank
v Weber County, 54 Utah 599, 183 P 334
(1919)
Payment of tax under protest without designation of the part protested did not deny taxpayer nght to recover since the precise amount
wrongfully assessed may be established at
tnal. Peterson v Bountiful City, 25 Utah 2d
126, 477 P.2d 153 (1970)
Standing.
Plaintiff had sufficient standing to file claim
who alleged that property tax statute was unconstitutional in that it taxed a limited amount
of property, and allowed expenditure of tax
dollars on religious institutions that paid no
taxes, thus resulting in his having to pay more
in property taxes. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d
1145 (Utah 1983)

Statute of limitations.
Statute of limitations runs against right to
recover illegal tax, paid under protest, from
date on which such tax was paid Centennial
Eureka Mining Co \ Juab County, 22 Utah
395, 62 P 1024 (1900)
Action to recover taxes paid under unconstitutional statute was barred where not brought
w ithm six months as required by former § 1042-27, Code 1943 Sperry & Hutchinson Co v
Mattson, 64 Utah 214, 228 P. 755 (1924)
An action under this section against a count\
is not subject to the 6-month statute of limitations m § 78-12-31(2), the applicable limitations statute in such a case is § 78-12-25
Stevensen v Monson, 856 P.2d 355 (Utah Ct
App ), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993)
Suit against state in federal courts.
Former section fell short of the clear declaration by a state of its consent to be sued in the
federal courts that is required before federal
courts should undertake the adjudication of
claims of taxpayers against the state
Kennecott Copper Corp v. State Tax Comm'n,
327 U.S. 573, 66 S. Ct. 745, 90 L. Ed. 862
(1946).
Void levy.
Where municipality's annexation was void
because majority of landowners had not requested it as required under former § 10-3-1,
municipal tax levied upon the land while the
case was pending was also void. Peterson v
Bountiful City, 25 Utah 2d 126, 477 P.2d 153
(1970).

59-2-1328. Payment under protest — Judgment for recovery — Payment — Tax levy.
(1) If it is determined in any action that a tax, or any portion of the tax, paid
under protest, was unlawfully collected, a judgment for recovery of the tax plus
interest as provided by law, together with costs of action, shall be entered in
favor of the taxpayer. Upon being presented a duly authenticated copy of the
judgment, the proper officer or officers of the state, county, or municipality
whose officers collected or received the tax shall audit and allow the judgment,
and cause a warrant to be drawn for the amount recovered by the judgment. If
the judgment is obtained against a county, and any portion of the taxes
included in the judgment are state, district, school, or other taxes levied by a
taxing entity which have been or may be paid over to the state or to any school
district or other taxing entity by the county, the proper officer or officers of the
state, school district, or other taxing entity shall, upon demand by the county,
cause a warrant to be drawn upon the treasurer of the state, school district, or
other taxing entity in favor of the county for the amount of the taxes received,
together with interest as provided by law and an equitable portion of the costs,
of the action.
(2) Each taxing entity may levy a tax to pay its share of the judgment under
Subsection (1). This levy is in addition to, and exempt from, the maximum levy
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RESOLUTION NO.
A RESOLUTION SETTING GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS ON PROPERTY
TAX REFUNDS TO QUALIFIED PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL TAX PAYERS
WHEREAS, the* Summit County Commission has determined that
equitable considerations require differential tax refunds to
those certain tax payers who qualified for "primary residential
exemptions", but who paid "secondary residential rate" taxes;
and,
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has further determined
that such differential refunds should only be distributed within
strict guidelines and to qualified tax payers only,
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED pursuant to the authorisation
of U.C.A. 59-2-1321, that the County Assessor and County
Treasurer are hereby directed and authorized to make differential
refunds as follows:
1.

Refunds may be made of the difference between taxes

actually paid at the secondary rate which should have been paid
at the primary residential rate.
2.

Applications shall only be considered for such partial

refund of taxes paid during tax years 1987 thru 1991 inclusive.
Applications will only be accepted until 5:00 p.m. August 31,
1992; thereafter only current year applications will be accepted
or processed.
3.

Applications for refunds must be accompanied by

satisfactory and verifiable proof of primary residency status

during each year the refund is claimed.

Such items as voter

registrations, school registrations, state and federal income tax
returns, drivers licenses, telephone and utility listings, etc.
may be accepted as evidence of residency status.
4.

Applications for refunds will only be received or

accepted from individual tax payers or the tax payer's attorneyat-law or an attorney-in-fact possessing regularly executed and
recorded general or special powers of attorney for the tax payer.
5.

Applications for refunds shall be made to the Assessor's

Office.

Any and all refunds shall be made as quickly as possible

and shall not bear interest.
6.

Applicants who are denied refunds may appeal such denial

to the Summit County Commission.
PASSED AND ADOPTED this T~

day of June, 1992.

SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSION:
I

SHELDON D. RICHINS, CHAIRMAN
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SUMMIT COUNTY
Affidavit Of Primary Residence
Pursuant to 59-2-103 UCA
I hereby certify that
1) Thetomjkmowner of the following described property (please print name, street address or
condominium unit number and mailing address).is:
A, E., Inc.,

a Utah Corporation

Serial §

EECrl

Unit 7 The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley
c/o Miio S. Marsden, Jr.
68 South Main, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
of Bret Alan Anderson
he has
The above described property is joy permanent, full timeresidenc^and thaf KlWKno
other permanent residence either in the State of Utah or any other state.
the

2)

Date of Occupancy

Noventer 20, 1992
OR

I am leasing the above described property on a year round basis as of the
day of
_
_,19
• Attached is a copy of the lease agreement and/or below is the
name and address of the person (s) the property is being leasedtowho use this property
as a primary residence.

I understand that pursuant to Utah Code 59-2-309 (2), that any misrepresentation of this affidavit
subjects the owner to severe penalties.
A.E. Inc., a Utah Corpc^aft^on
Signed By ^ c
*!•»
Milo S. Marsa^i, Jr., iaqzi Counsel
Dated February 3,
Submission of this application authorizes the Assessor to request or collect information sufficient
to veriiy primary residence status. A listing of criteria used to determine residence status is
found on the back of this form.

SUMMIT COUNT*
Affidavit Of Primary Residence
Pursuant to 59-2-103 UCA
I hereby certify that
1) Thefiaocja*owner of diefollowingdescribed property (please print name, street address or
condominium unit number and mailing address), i s :
A. E., Inc., a Utah Corporation

Seriali

BBC-7

Unit 7 The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley
c/o Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
68 South Main, #500
Salt lake City, UT 84101
2)

^
of Bret Alan Anderson
he has
The above described property is a y permanent, MtiDae«sid«ic^andtJiafMawno
other permanent residence either in the State of Utah or any other state.
Date of Occupancy

Novenfaer 20, 1992
OR

I am leasing the above described property on a year round basis as of the_i___day of
,19
. Attached is a copy of the lease agreement and/or below is the
name and address of the person (s) the property is being leased to who use this property
as a primary residence.

I understand that pursuant to Utah Code 59-2-309 (2), that any misrepresentation of this affidavit
subjects the owner to severe penalties.
A.E. I n c . , a Utah Corpora
Signed Jy_
Milo S. Marsfen, Jr., Esgal Counsel
Dated February 3,
Submission of this application authorizes the Assessor to request or collect information sufficient
to verify primary residence status. A listing of criteria used to determine residence status is
found on the back of this form.
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B«rb«rtJ.Kx«sMr

SUMMIT COUHTY COUMT House

MQoMarsden
Fifth Floor
68 South main
Sah Lake City, Utah 84101
RE: Primary Resident status on lots 7 & 8, Bald Eagle Club @ Deer Vauey
DearMr.Marsden;
IwiI1 change the status of these two
Pursuant to our conversation of Apnl 17,1997wm cn*°s
onFd,ittary
properties to Prin^ Resident based on ^ e a p p ^ a ^ ^ ^
3,1997. Ttecurrearedttrfonmassessed value ,s 45/, at
tom^o
^
Thepowertograntrefundsbasedontochangems^WP^
e a ^
t^year does not r e s t ^ m e Assessor. The A s ^ r c a n ^ e ^ m ^
Commissioners. It is my understanding that they would be " « * » ^
if the taxpayer had notfiledtheir exemption application at some p o r t a the p
^ r ^ u g h * e B o - d of Equalization during me years« quesoon.

Sr. Staff Appraiser
Summit County Assesor-s Office

00r
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MAX_ J I N , CABOONI GorrruDf ON 4 .. JLL, L X . C .

nrrM rtoo«
^.^l"—*""*
wouwfecijcow.>.ft

• • »OWTH MAIN
BAXJt LAJO ClTT, UTAH 8 4 1 0 1
(SOI) S2I-3800
FAX (SOW 537-13/3

oreouM
»*•«»'

April 24,1997

Summit County Commission
P.O. Box 128
CoaMDc, UT 84017
Re- Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8
Dear Commission Members:
I represent A £ . Ina, a Utah corporation, which has paid taxes under protest since
1992 for failure of the Summit County Assessor to grant the residential 45% reduction
exemption allowed by Article XDI, Section 2, Utah Constitution, and implemented by the
Utah Legislature as § 59-2-103.
A copy of the 1997 Assessor's letter granting the exemption is enclosed.
I am enclosing copies of the 1992 -1996 property tax notices. All payments were
made in full under protest by certified mail, return receipt requested. I am also enclosing
the worksheet of the tax difference, $70,182.79.
It is respectfully requested that you grant the refund because the properties should
have received the primary residential reduction, but due to the Assessor's error in
classification, it was not granted. Therefore, it should be refunded at this time.
If you have any questions, please give me a call.
Very truly yours,

Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
MSM/gz
Enclosures

0091
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Barbara J/Kr«t
aer
Ass«$iof

1909
S U M M I T C O U N T Y COUWT House

August 14, 1997
Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson, & Bell, L.L.C.
Fifth Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah^JB4101
Dear Mr. Marsden:
Kent Jones, the Summit County Clerk, has asked that I respond to
your letter dated July 17, 1997, regarding the two lots in Bald
Eagle Club at Deer Valley identified as BEC-7 and BEC-8.
Mr. Jones met with the Board of County Commissioners during their
regular work meeting August 11, 1997 and discussion was held on
your request. It was their decision to deny any refund of taxes on
these parcels. As has been explained before, it is the policy of
Summit County not to make refunds on previous years.
Summit County (as well as the State Tax Commission) takes the
position that the primary exemption is an exemption and must be
applied for. This exemption will be granted for the current year
if it is found that the request meets the established criteria.
Sincerely,

Barbara J . nuresser
Summit County Assessor

AUG 18 1997

PO BOX 128 • COALVtUE. UTAH 040! T
• V-AX IHOII Ijft 44S0
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SUMMIT COUNTY
ORDINANCE NO. ?>\S
AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR A PROCEDURE
AND CRITERIA IN GRANTING RESIDENTIAL
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS
PREAMBLE
WHEREAS, the Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2(8), and U.C.A. 59-2102(22) & 103(2) (1953), as amended, provide that a "residential exemption" to property tax
of 45% is available for "primary residences;" and,
WHEREAS, neither the State Code, nor Utah State Tax Commission rules, provide a
definition of "primary residence," except to state that a "transient residential use or
condominiums used in rental pools" are not considered primary residences; and,
WHEREAS, Utah Code, Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 11, discusses property tax
exemptions in general, but is silent as to the "residential exemption;" and,
WHEREAS, Utah Code, Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 11, provides for an exemption
application process, which includes the filing of an affidavit, prior to the granting of a
property tax exemption; and,
WHEREAS, U.C.A. 59-2-1101(4) & 1102(1) state that "[t]he county legislative body
may adopt rules to effectuate the exemptions provided" and may "determine whether certain
property within the county is exempt from taxation;" and,
WHEREAS, U.C.A. 59-2-1001 states that the County "may make and enforce any
rule which is consistent with statute and commission rule, and necessary for the government
of the [Bjoard [of Equalization], the preservation of order and the transaction of business;"
and,
WHEREAS, in recognition of the diverse varieties of property ownership in Summit
County a proper procedure for granting "residential exemptions" and defining the criteria
allowing for such grants needs to be established; and,
WHEREAS, it is the opinion of the County Commission that residency should be
determined by the quality and quantity of the actual occupancy and not by the class of
structure, nor the intended use of the structure; and,

1

WHEREAS, providing for a standardized procedure and criteria to grant "residential
exemptions" to property tax, where the State Code and State Tax Commission are silent, is
in the best interests of Summit County;
NOW THEREFORE, the County Legislative Body of the County of Summit, the
State of Utah, ordains as follows:
Section 1.

Procedure.

A. A property owner or his/her designee (applicant) shall submit an application for
residential exemption from property taxes to the Summit County Assessor no latter
than May 22 of the current tax year. An application shall be in the form of an
affidavit and shall contain, at a minimum, the following information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

property identification (serial number, address, etc.),
identity of the applicant/affiant,
basis of the applicant/affiant's knowledge of the use of the property;
authority to make the affidavit on behalf of the owner (if applicable),
county where property is located, and
nature of use of the property.

B. In the event that an affidavit is not timely filed, an exemption may be granted by
the Board of Equalization on an individual appeal basis for the current tax year only.
At the close of the Board of Equalization, no further appeals for exemptions will be
considered until the following tax year.
C. A new affidavit of primary residence must be filed when ownership or the status
of habitancy changes. Any misrepresentation on the affidavit subjects the owner to a
penalty equal to the tax on the property's value.
D. Submission of the affidavit authorizes the Summit County Assessor to request or
collect information sufficient to verify primary residence status.
E. If an applicant requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the
residential exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the
property serves as a primary residence. The burden of proof shall remain at all times
with the applicant.
Section 2.

Criteria.

A. A primary residence is the principal place where one (property owner or
inhabitant) actually lives as distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though
motels and other transient properties would not meet this definition, rentals (on a
yearly basis) would qualify for the residential property tax exemption.
2

B. A primary residence shall be defined by the following factors with respect to the
property owner / property inhabitant (claimant):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

(12)
(13)
(14)

(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

an approved application for residential exemption,
the presence of the claimant on the voter registry in the area claimed as
a primary residence,
the length of continuous residency in the place claimed as a primary
residence,
the nature and quality of the living accommodations at the claimed
primary residence,
the presence of family members at the claimed primary residence,
the place of residence of the claimant's spouse,
the physical location of the claimant's place of business or sources of
income,
the physical location of the claimant's banking facilities,
the location of registration of claimant's vehicles, boats, and RVs,
claimant's membership in clubs, churches, and other social
organizations,
the claimant's addresses used on such things as:
(a)
telephone listings,
(b)
mail,
(c)
state and federal tax returns,
(d)
listings in official government publications or other
correspondence,
(e)
driver's license,
(f)
voter registration, and
(g)
tax rolls,
the location of public schools attended by the claimant or his/her
dependents,
the nature and payment of taxes in other states,
declarations of the claimant:
(a)
communicated to third parties,
(b)
contained in deeds,
(c)
contained in insurance policies,
(d)
contained in wills,
(e)
contained in letters,
(f)
contained in registers,
(g)
contained in mortgages, and
(h)
contained in leases,
the exercise of civil or political rights in a given location,
the failure to obtain permits and licenses normally required of a
resident of the area,
the purchase of a burial plot in a particular location, and
the acquisition of a new residence in a different location.
3

C. Where a property owner owns more than one residence in Utah, or elsewhere,
none of which are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a
primary residence for purposes of the residential property tax exemption. Only the
residence which is occupied more than six months out of the year qualifies for the
residential exemption.
D. Married couples may only claim one property as* a primary residence except
where separate residences are maintained and occupied under a court approved
separation agreement.
E. Partial or incomplete homes, as of January 1 of the tax year, will not be given the
residential exemption until the following year when the full market value is placed on
the county tax assessment roll, a certificate of occupancy has been issued by the
county, and the completed structure is occupied by a full time resident. It is the
occupancy that qualifies the property for the exemption.
F. To qualify for the residential exemption, a property need not be property owner
occupied. Apartments and other rental housing used as a primary residence (property
inhabitant) qualify for the residential exemption upon accepted application in
accordance with Section 1 above and paragraph B of this Section.
G. The residential exemption is limited to up to one acre of land per residential
dwelling unit on a single property description.
Section 3.

Grandfather Provision,

As of the effective date of this Ordinance, property owners whose Summit County
property is currently listed by the County Assessor as having a residential exemption
shall not be required to file an application and affidavit to continue its status.
However, should ownership or the property inhabitant's status change, the property
shall no longer be considered exempt and an application and affidavit under the
provisions of this Ordinance shall apply.
Section 4.

Conflict.

In the event of any conflict between this Ordinance and State or Federal law, the
provisions of the latter shall be controlling.

4

Section 5.

Savings Clause,

In the event one or more of the provisions of this Ordinance shall, for any reason, be
held to be unenforceable or invalid in any respect under any applicable laws, such
unenforceability or invalidity shall not affect any other provision; and in such an
event, this Ordinance shall be construed as if such unenforceable or invalid provision
had never been contained herein.
Section 6.

Effective Date.

This Ordinance shall become effective after publication of such in accordance with
applicable State law.
APPROVED, ADOPTED, AND PASSED and ordered published by the
Summit County Board of Commissioners, this ZZ1^ day of5eqWSc<? 1997,
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

By:ia^^Lj
Chairman

Commissioner Soter voted:
Commissioner Richins voted:
Commissioner Schifferli voted:

Coiinty Clerk
Summit County, Utah
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
V^k

A ^ ^ r W C^\^ c/fc*^

Deputy County Attorney
Summit County, Utah

5
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service member is stationed out of Utah, but the personal property remains in Utah, the property
is not exempt from property tax.
2.123 Personal Property of Non-Utah Residents Stationed in Utah. Personal property
owned by non-Utah residents who are members of the armed forces and stationed under military
orders in Utah is exempt from property tax. The assessor may rely on a letter from the
commanding officer or other documentation verifying out-of-state residency and military orders
assigning the service member to Utah. For example, if the non-Utah resident service member
owned a non-commercial mobile home in Utah, the property would be exempt. (50 USC 574)

Standard of Practice 2.13
Primary Residential Exemption
2.13.0 Primary Residential Exemption. Utah law requires assessors to exempt from
taxation 45% of the fair market value of residential property. [Section 59-2-130(2)] Utah Code
Annotated Section 59-2-102(22) and rule R884-24P-52 define residential property, for purposes
of the exemption, to be a primary residence, A primary residence does not include property used
for transient residential use, or condominiums used in rental pools. [Utah State Constitution,
Article Xm, Section 2(8), (59-2-103)]
To qualify-, a property need not be owner occupied. Apartments and other rental housing
used as a primary residence qualify for the exemption. The assessor shall grant the residential
exemption to the first one acre of land, if listed in the same parcel description. The property
owner has the burden of proving that property qualifies for the exemption.
Guidelines:
•

A "primary residence" is the principal place where one actually lives as
distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though motel and other
transient properties would not meet this definition, typical student housing, used
by renters during the school year (more than six months), would qualify for the
exemption.

•

If a person requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the
exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the property
serves as the person's primary residence. If the person's address on the Utah
driver's license and/or voter registration is in a county different from that of the
property location address, the county where the application is made should notify
the other county assessor.

•

Where a person or persons own more than one residence in Utah, none of which
are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a primary
residence. Only the residence which is occupied more than six months out of the
year qualifies for the exemption.
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•

Married couples may only claim one property as a primary residence except where
separate residences are maintained and occupied under a court approved
separation agreement

Further instruction has been provided by the Commission in an Advisory Opinion dated
September 17,1997. This advisory opinion states:
"Property that is eligible for the primary residential exemption on the lien date is entitled
to the exemption, even if the property is temporarily unoccupied For example, assume that a
home was sold prior to the lien and the seller moved out prior to the lien date. Assume also that
the new owner does not move in until after January 1st. So long as the property use meets the
criteria for the primary residential exemption, the fact that it was temporarily unoccupied on the
January 1 st is irrelevant The situation may also arise with rental property that serves as the
primary residence of the tenants. The fact that the property may be temporarily vacant on the lien
date should not defeat the exemption.
"Another example of a primary residential property that may be unoccupied on the lien
date is a home under construction. It is our position that when property is committed to a.
qualifying use, that property is eligible for the exemption if (1) the dwelling is under construction
on the lien date, (2) the assessor has evidence that the house is being constructed for use as a
qualifying residential dwelling, and (3) the property is actually put to use as a primary residential
property upon completion during the tax year. If all of those conditions are met, the exemption
relates back to the lien date. This is true even if the owner is living in another primary residence
during construction. The primary exemption is based on the intended use of the two residences,
not the occupants.
"The only distinctions that we have drawn with regard to a property owner who owns two
homes in Utah are as follows:
"(1) If the property owner is a Utah resident, but neither of the homes is rented or
leased for use as a primary residence of another party. We assume that the owner is using one
home as a primary residence and the other as a secondary residence."
"(2) If the property owner is not a Utah resident, but owns residential property in
Utah, we assume that the owner is using the Utah property as secondary property unless the
owner shows that it its being used as a primary residence." (Dennis v. Summit county, 933 P.2d
387)

Standard of Practice 2.14
General Personal Property Exemptions
2.14,0 General Exemptions. "Household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used
exclusively by the owner at the owner's residence in maintaining a home for the owner and the
owner's family are exemptfromproperty taxation." [Section 59-2-1113 and Utah State
Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2 (8)]
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MILO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800
FAX NO.: (801) 537-1315
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
A E., INC., a Utah
Corporation,

]
]
Petitioner,

]) NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.

)

SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,

'
]

Respondent.

Case No.

]

To the Utah State Tax Commission and the County Auditor of Summit County, State of
Utah:
Petitioner, A. E., Inc. a Utah corporation, hereby appeals from the inaction of the
County Board of Equalization of Summit County, State of Utah, and respectfully shows:
1. Petitioner is the owner of the following-described real property in Summit
County, Utah:
Unit 7, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No.
BEC 7); and
Unit 8, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No. BEC-8).
2. Between 1992 and 1996, petitioner paid $70,182.79 excess real property taxes

for respondent's failure to grant petitioner the residential exemption for the real property
described above. 'A copy of the $70,182.79 annual analysis is attached hereto as Exhibit
"A".
3. Respondent granted the residential exemption for the real properties in 1997.
4. During 1992 through 1996, at all times, an individual residing on the property
qualified the property for the residential exemption under Section 59-2-103 Utah Code
Annotated.
5. Respondent by its failure to act has denied petitioner the $70,182.79 refund for
the years 1992 through 1996. Therefore, petitioner paid the taxes under protest, stating
that the protest was because the property had not been given the benefit of the
residential property tax exemption.
6. Petitioner has made demand upon respondent for payment, but no payment
has been made. Copies of the demand notices and the County's responses are attached
hereto as Exhibit "B".
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays judgment against respondent in the amount of
$70,182.79, interest, costs of court, and general relief.
ItTH

Juuy

DATED this flP™ day of Jt»e9 1998.

Milo S. MarsoenX Jr.
I J
MARSDEN(C£HOON, GOTTFREDSON
& BELL, LLC.
Attorneys for Petitioner
2

Exhibit

EXHIBIT A

U

^A

WORKSHEET OF TAX DIFFERENCE
(For Failure to Give Residential Exemption
Under 5 59-2-103, Utah Code Annotated)

1996 Unit 7

$4,216,103

$48,240.65

x45%

=

$21,708.29

1996 Unit 8

644,000

7,368.65

x45%

=

3,315.89

1995 Unit 7

3,488,103

44,333.79

x 45%

=

19,950.21

1995 Unit 8

560,000

7,117.60

x45%

=

3,202.92

1994 Unit 7

1,641,068

26,844.59

x32%

=

8,590.27

1994 Unit 8

393,750

6,440.96

x32%

=

2,061.11

1993 Unit 7

1,641,06s1*

26,320.85

29.5-5=24.5% =

6,448.61

1993 Unit 8

393,750*

6,315.34

29.5-5=24.5% =

1,547.26

1992 Unit 7

443,750*

7,262.69

29.5-5=24.5% =

1,779.36

1992 Unit 8

393,750*

6,444.38

29.5-5=24.5% =

1.578.87

TOTAL2

$70,182.79

Taxabla valua for 1992 and 1993 was 95% of markat ralaa.
f 55-2-103
Spinning January 1, 1992, and arary yaar tharaaftar tha fair aaxkat raloa of
raaidaatial proparty thall ba raducad by 29.301, rapratanting a raaidaatial
axaaqption allowad undar artiela XIII, Sac. 2, Utah Constitution.
••ginning January 1, 1994, and arary yaar tharaaftar tha fair aarkat valaa of
raaidaatial proparty thall ba radacad by 32%, rapratanting a raaidaatial
aaaaytlon allowad andar Artiola XIII, Sac. 2, Utah Constitution.
••ginning Juna 1, 1993, tha fair markat valaa of ratidaatial proparty thall
ba radacad by 43%,rapratanting a raaidaatial axaaption allowad andar Artiola
C I I , Sac. 2, Otah Coattitution.

Exhibit"_S

EXHIBIT B

LAW OFFICES
M A R S D E N , CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & B E L L , L . I i . C .
FIFTH FLOOR
6 8 SOUTH MAIN

MILO »• MAASOCM. J * .
RICHAAO C. CAMOOM. P.C.
j . MICMACU a o r r m c o s o N

S A L T L A X I CITT, U T A H

o r couNscu
• i ^ I N K O. W1LUAMS

84101

MO«CKT r. OUTON, m.c

(80I) 521-3800
FAX (SOI) 537-1315

MAMK r m a i M U ) M U .

J u l y 15, 1998

Utah State Tax Commission
210 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84134-6200
Re:

A, E., Inc,. vs. Summit County Board of Equalization

Dear Commissioners:
Enclosed please find a Notice of Appeal in the captioned
matter.
I would appreciate this being set for an initial hearing.
If you have any questions, please give me a call.
Very truly yours,

Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
MSM/gz
Enclosure

MEMO TO FILE

To:

3742, A & E, Inc.

From:

MSM

Date:

December 19, 1997

I met with Steve Martin at the Summit County Assessor's
office in Coalville, Utah, December 16, 1997. We discussed the
best way to qualify Bald Eagle Units 7 and 8, for property
assessment purposes. I had computed with him earlier if it were
one assessment notice rather than two, under the Summit County
formula there would be an annual savings of over $10,000. He
said the easiest way for him to be able to grant that type of
assessment would be to have the Recorder's office include Units 7
and 8 in one assessment and directed me next door Alan Sprigg,
Summit County Recorder. I met with Alan Sprigg's assistant
clerks and we reviewed the plat map. They then made the
necessary changes on the computer. For the tax year 1998, there
should be a single assessment.
I then returned to Steve Martin's office and confirmed with
him that the single assessment would be made beginning 1998.
I then stepped down to the office of the Summit County Clerk
and met with Kent Jones. He had on his desk the recent letter
and exhibits that I had sent to Barbara Kresser. He said that he
had discussed them with Dave Thomas, Deputy Summit County
Attorney. Dave had asked him to check the Assessor's records to
see if an appeal had been filed from the Board of Equalization
decisions for the years 1992 through 1996. He had not yet done
that.
I believe he will find that there was an appeal each year
and that the Assessor granted relief on market valuation but not
on the primary/secondary classification issue. Accordingly, the
tax was paid under protest.
I need to research the legal issue as to what constitutes an
appeal from the Board of Equalization. Does paying under protest
constitute an appeal? Or must there be some more formal type of
appeal? What are the time frames for taking the appeal? The
initial valuation notice comes about September 1st. Does the 30day appeal right begin then? I believe the 30-day appeal right
begins no earlier than the date the Board of Equalization renders
its adverse decision. If it were otherwise, there could easily
be more than 30 days between sending the September 1st valuation
notice and the Board of Adjustment hearing. How can you appeal a
Board of Adjustment decision until that decision has been made?

MSM

MEMO TO FILE

To:

3742, A & E, Inc.

From:

MSM

Date:

December 9, 1997

I spoke with Steve Martin December 5, 1997. He suggested I
show him and the recorder a site map of the home on Lots 7 and 8.
He will then approve the recorder and assessor giving a single
serial number to the two-lot description. This should be an
assessment savings of about $900,000. Using the 1997 tax rate of
.011810, this would be an annual savings of $10,629.
In computing the tax savings, I reviewed the tax notice. It
lists the various tax rates for the various entities, and the
total is .006492. It then shows a district tax rate of .011810.
The difference is .005318. What is the explanation for the
difference between the effective tax and the district tax rate?
I talked to Steve Martin about this and we said we would
discuss it next week when I got to Summit County for the lot line
adjustment.

MSM

MEMO TO FILE

To:

3742, A & E, Inc.

From:

MSM

Date:

November 20, 1997

Re:

Tax Refund File, 1992-1996

I received a call from John Thomas, Assistant Summit County
Attorney, November 19, 1997.
We discussed the need for a final determination from the
Board of Adjustment. Barbara Kresser should be able to do this.
If she can't, call the Summit County Clerk for an agenda time.
Dave Thomas said there should be a year-by-year
determination by the Board of Equalization.

MEMO TO FILE

To:

3742, A & E, Inc.

From:

MSM

Date:

September 15, 1997

I talked with Steve Martin September 13, 1997. I
had tried to reach the County offices on September 12,
3:00 until 4:45 and there was no answer. I had spoken
about August 18th relative to the values of Bald Eagle
8.

told him I
1997, from
with him
lots 7 and

He said the State had required them to re-examine unimproved
lots and that he had made an analysis, and when the information
went into the new computer program, it produced values higher
than calculated. He did say, however, that on lots where there
were improvements, the lot values were all right. Nevertheless,
he said it appeared the lot values for Bald Eagle lots 7 and 8 is
too high and that he would look at the increases and make an
adjustment. He will call me about the adjustment amounts.
We discussed the benefit of combining lots 7 and 8. He said
th^y would then receive one lot value. It is a situation where
th§ whole is not as valuable as its parts. Therefore, there is a
tax benefit in combining the two lots.
He referred me to the Summit County Recorder. I talked with
Julie of that office, who is familiar with the procedures. She
told me that I should contact the Park City Planning. I talked
with Kirsten, who is very familiar with the procedure. She is
sending me a packet. It requires the consent of the adjoining
land owners. She will also enclose 3 small mylar drawing that an
engineer will need to modify to show the combining of lots 7 and
8. According to Kirsten, it is the recording of the mylar plat
th&t effectuates the combining of the lots. It does not require
a deed recording. She said that Summit County was instrumental
in creating Section 17-27-808(6) which provides for petitions to
adjust lot lines between adjacent properties.

MSM

MEMO TO FILE

To:

3742, A & E, Inc.

From:

MSM

Date:

October 28, 1997

I talked with Barbara Kresser, Summit County Assessor,
October 27, 1997. She said that she entered office in 1991 and
became aware of a problem or discrepancies between residential
and non-residential classifications. When she sent out letters
to home owners, all heck broke loose. As a result, the County
Commission said they would go back five years, one time only, and
make refunds upon proper proof. Barbara said she would send me a
copy of the Summit County Commission resolution to that effect.
She said she had no authority to say whether the
administrative remedy was exhausted. She conferred with Dave
Thomas, Assistant Summit County Attorney, and he told her she
could not address that issue. His telephone number is 336-4451,
ext. 3206.
I received the resolution entitled, "A Resolution Setting
Guidelines and Limitations on Property Tax Refunds to Qualified
Primary Residential Taxpayers". Its authorization is based in
Section 59-2-1321, Utah Code Annotated.1
The refund by the County Treasurer is upon order of the
County governing body.
Read the following cases: Nielsen v. Sanpete County, 123 P.
334, and Shea v. State Tax Commission, 120 P.2d, 274 (1941).
The county resolution refers to refunds made of the
difference between taxes actually paid at the secondary rate
which should have been paid at the primary residential rate.
Applications are only considered for partial refund of taxes paid
during tax years 19Q7 through 1991. Our claim is for the tax
years 1992 through 1996. The commission says that after August
31, 1992, only current year applications will be accepted or
processed. The resolution provides that refunds will not bear
interest.

i
This Section 59-2-1321 it entitled "Erroneous or Illegal Asseaaraents-Deductions and Refunds." It
provides that the county governing body, upon aufficient evidence that the property has been erroneously or
illegally assessed may order the county treasurer to allow the taxes on that part of the property to be deducted
before payment of taxes.
Any taxes, interest, or costs paid more than once or erroneously or illegally
collected, may be refunded by the county treaaurer.

3742, Memo to File
October 28, 1997
Page 2

Section, 59-2-1328, which is not in the resolution, provides
for payment under protest—judgment for recovery—payment—tax
levy. If it is determined in any action that a tax or any
portion of the tax paid under protest was unlawfully collected, a
judgment for recovery of the tax, plus interest, is provided by
law, together with cost of action, shall be entered in favor of
the taxpayer.
Section 59-2-1330 provides for payment of property taxes—
unlawful collection by county—liability of state or taxing
entity—treatment of disputed taxes. If the commission or a
court of competent jurisdiction orders a reduction in the amount
of any tax levied against any property for tax purposes, the
taxpayer shall be reimbursed. The state and any taxing entity
which has received property taxes or any portion of property
taxes is liable to the judgment debtor for the amount the state
or the taxing entity received, plus interest, and for an
equitable portion of the cost of action.

MSM

'-A*Y%

% fy I- //& 2-

RESOLUTION NO.
A RESOLUTION SETTING GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS OH PROPERTY
TAX REFUNDS TO QUALIFIED PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL TAX PAYERS
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has determined that
equitable considerations require differential tax refunds to
those certain tax payers who qualified for "primary residential
exemption*", but who paid "secondary residential rate" taxes;
and,
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has further determined
that such differential refunds should only be distributed within
strict guidelines and to qualified tax payers

only,

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED pursuant to the authorization
of U.C.A. 59-2-1321, that the County Assessor and County
Treasurer are hereby directed and authorised to sake differential
refunds as follows:
1.

Refunds may be made of the difference between taxes

actually paid at the secondary rate which should have been paid
at the primary residential rate.
2.

Applications shall only be considered for such partial

refund of taxes paid during tax years 1987 thru 1991 inclusive.
Applications will only be accepted until 5x00 p.m. August 31,
1992; thereafter only current year applications will be accepted
or processed.
3.

Applications for refunds must be accompanied by

satisfactory and verifiable proof of primary residency status

during each year the refund is clalmtd.

Such items as voter

registrations, school registrations, state and federal income tax
returns, drivers licenses, telephone and utility listings, etc.
may be accepted as evidence of residency status.
4. Applications for refunds will only be received or
accepted from individual tax payers or the tax payer's attorneyat-law or an attorney-in-fact possessing regularly executed and
recorded general or special powers of attorney for the tax payer.
5. Applications for refunds shall be made to the Assessor's
Office.

Any and all refunds shall be made as quickly as possible

and shall not bear interest.
6.

Applicants who are denied refunds may appeal such denial

to the Summit County Commission.
PASSED AHD ADOPTED this 9^

day of June, 1992.

SUHHEP COUNTY BOARD OP COMMISSION*
I

*L

SHELDON D. RICHINS, CHAIRMAN

RONALD A.

y^^U^
H. GENS MOSSR

SUMMIT COUNTY CLERK

Barbara J. Kresser
Assessor
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August 14, 1997
Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson, & Bell, L.L.C.
Fifth Floor '
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dear Mr. Marsden:
Kent Jones, the Summit County Clerk, has asked that I respond to
your letter dated July 17, 1997, regarding the two lots in Bald
Eagle Club at Deer Valley identified as BEC-7 and BEC-8.
Mr. Jones met with the Board of County Commissioners during their
regular work meeting August 11, 1997 and discussion was held on
your request. It was their decision to deny any refund of taxes on
these parcels. As has been explained before, it is the policy of
Summit County not to make refunds on previous years.
Summit County (as well as the State Tax Commission) takes the
position that the primary exemption is an exemption and must be
applied for. This exemption will be granted for the current year
if it is found that the request meets the established criteria.
Sincerely,

Barbara J . 4 ( r e s s e r
Summit County Assessor

AUG J 8 1997

P.O. BOX 128 • COALVILLE. UTAH 84017

October 21, 1991

CERTIFIED MAIL
Glen G. Thompson
Summit County Treasurer
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017-0128
Re:

Payment of

Property Taxes Under Protest

A. E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Uno.t 8, the
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a
check in the amount of $26,320.85 in payment of the 199« property
taxes for the property located at Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at
Deer Valley, Utah. The account number is 0266118.
The corporation believes that 29.50% of the taxes assessed
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the
county and state.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-21327, 29.50% of the total 1993 taxes due are paid under protect.
Sincerely,

s

A. E. INC.
a Utah Corporation

By

.

wenvn

LAW O F F I C E S

M A R S D E N , CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & B E L L , L . L . C .
MIWO a. MAASOCN. JH.

FIFTH FLOOR
^ 3 S O U T H MAIN
SAJLT LAJOB C I T Y . U T A H

MARK rtTZOCMAtA »CLL

°*i***—*^
84101

(80U 52!*3SOO

*CNOCU. N. MABCY

FAX 180I) 537-1315

September 2, 1997
CERTIFIED MAIL
Barbara J. Kresser, Assessor
Summit County, State of Utah
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017
Dear Ms. Kresser:
Thank you for your August 14, 1997 response to my April 24,
1997 letter and my follow-up letter of July 17, 1997, Certified
Mail, Return Receipt Requested. Copies of my earlier
correspondence are attached as Exhibits MAH and M B".
I understand that Summit County's position is that the
primary exemption must be applied for. The taxpayer applied for
the primary exemption. The application was denied, and the
taxpayer paid the taxes at the non-primary rate under protest.
The exemption for the year 1997 has been granted, and the
1997 taxes will be paid at the primary resident rate. A copy of
the 1997 primary exemption is attached as Exhibit "C". However,
the taxpayer is entitled to the primary rate for the prior years
paid under protest.
Because the taxpayer has met Summit County's primary
exemption application requirements, I would appreciate your
reconsideration of this matter.
I would be happy to meet in person with you or the Summit
County Board of Commissioners to review the prior year
applications, the correspondence and the payments made under
protest in an effort to settle these pre-1997 tax claims.
A copy of your August 14, 1997 letter is attached as Exhibit
M

DM.

If we are not able to settle these pre-1997 tax claims,
would you confirm that I have exhausted the administrative
remedy. I will then file a complaint with the Third Judicial
District Court, Summit County, Utah.

MSM/gz

(3

Barbara J. Kresser
Assessor

1909
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August 14, 1997
Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson, & Bell, L.L.C.
Fifth Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dear Mr. Marsden:
Kent Jones, the Summit County Clerk, has asked that I respond to
your letter dated July 17, 1997, regarding the two lots in Bald
Eagle Club at Deer Valley identified as BEC-7 and BEC-8.
Mr. Jones met with the Board of County Commissioners during their
regular work meeting August 11, 1997 and discussion was held on
your request. It was their decision to deny any refund of taxes on
these parcels. As has been explained before, it is the policy of
Summit County not to make refunds on previous years.
Summit County (as well as the State Tax Commission) takes the
position that the primary exemption is an exemption and must be
applied for. This exemption will be granted for the current year
if it is found that the request meets the established criteria.
Sincerely,

Barbara J . d r e s s e r
Summit County Assessor

AUG J 8 S97

P.O. BOX 128 • COALVILLE. UTAH 84017

MEMO TO FILE

To:

3742, A & E, Inc.

From:

MSM

Date:

August 14, 1997

I received a call from Kent Jones, Summit County Clerk,
August 14, 1997.
He said he has presented my letter and the
accompanying documents to the Board of County Commissioners. Their
official position is that they take no action. They say that they
support the Summit County Assessor, that they will not open
previous years.
I r^jJorted that I had met with Steve Martin of the Summit
County rtommiggifan'o office each year and filed a protest.
He
adjusted the valuation but did not give the residential
classification.
Each year the adjusted amount was paid under
protest on the residency issue. Ultimately, in 1997, the Assessor
has recognized the residency classification. I am now seeking to
apply •&£-residency qualification to the prior years.
Kent Jones said he would cause a letter to be sent to me
stating that the Summit County Commission takes no action. He said
the letter may come from the Summit County Assessor. I told Kent
Jones I need the letter to satisfy the exhaustion of administrative
remedies prior to filing a complaint in the Third Judicial District
Court, Summit County, State of Utah.

MSM

LAW O F F I C E S

M A R S D E N , CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & B E L L , I i - L . C .
FIFTH FLOOR
6 8 SOUTH MAIN

Ml CO S. MAASOCM. J *.
RICHAAO C. CAHOON. » C

OTCOUMSCL;
auMNC a WIUJAMS

SAI-T LAKJB CITY, U T A H

j . MICHAEL ocrrmto%OH

noscirr r. OUTON. P.C

84101

fttMOCU.

(SOU 521-3800
FAX (80I) 537-1315

MAAK riTZOCAACO BCLL

M. MABCY

July 17, 1997

CERTIFIED MAIL
Summit County Commission
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017
Re:

Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8

Dear Commission Members:
On April 24, 1997, I wrote you concerning the captioned
matter.
A copy of that letter and attachments thereto are
enclosed.
I have called 801-336-4451, Ext. 3, on many occasions. I did
receive a call back from Kent Jones on June 25 1997 "-ponding to
a call I placed to the Commission June 17, 1997. I have also
called Anita Lewis and left messages.
I would appreciate a reply to my April 24, 1997 letter.
Very truly yours,

Milo S.
MSM/az
SENDER;.
•Complete items 1 anoVor 2 for additional services.
• Complete items 3, 4a, and 4b.
• Print your name and address on tne mvn% of this form so that we can return this
card to you.
•Attach this form to the front of the mailpiece, or on the back if space does not
permit.
•Write 'ftarum flecevpf fteQuesteo" on the mailpiece below the article number.
• T h e Return Receipt wil show to whom the article was delivered and the date
delivered.
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July 17, 1997

rgpTTFTED MAIL

Summit County Commission
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017
Re:

Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8

Dear Commission Members:
^
nr^i -ii 1997 I wrote you concerning the captioned
P
A copy' of that letter ^nd attachments thereto are
Mtt«?
enclosed.
I have called 801-336-4451, Ext. 3, on
^ J ^ ™ ^ ^
receive a call back from Kent Jones on J™*25'™*1
^ C v e also
a call I placed to the Commission June 17, 1997. i
called Anita Lewis and left messages.
I would appreciate a reply to my April 24, 1997 letter.
Very truly yours,
Z 735 5bfl S i d
Receipt for
Certified Mail
No Insurance Coverage Provided
Do not use for International Mail
(See Reverse)
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April 24, 1997

Summit County Commission
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017
Re: Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8
Dear Commission Members:
I represent A.E. Inc., a Utah corporation, which has paid taxes under protest since
1992 for failure of the Summit County Assessor to grant the residential 45% reduction
exemption allowed by Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution, and implemented by the
Utah Legislature as § 59-2-103.
A copy of the 1997 Assessor's letter granting the exemption is enclosed.
I am enclosing copies of the 1992 - 1996 property tax notices. All payments were
made in full under protest by certified mail, return receipt requested. I am also enclosing
the worksheet of the tax difference, $70,182.79.
It is respectfully requested that you grant the refund because the properties should
have received the primary residential reduction, but due to the Assessor's error in
classification, it was not granted. Therefore, it should be refunded at this time.
If you have any questions, please give me a call.
Very truly yours,

Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
MSM/gz
Enclosures

MEMO TO FILE

To:

3742, A. E., Inc.

From: MSM
Date: April 22, 1997
I received a call from Steve Martin in response to my call and letter of March 12,
1997. He said that property is now qualified for the 45% tax reduction for the year 1997.
There is no question that Bret Anderson qualifies the home for the residency tax break.
That is the good news.
The bad news is that the Assessor cannot make any reimbursement. He says that
approval for reimbursement must come from the Summit County Commission. Bret
Anderson has lived on the property since November, 1992. The taxes were paid under
protest. This should allow us direct access to the Third Judicial District Court, Summit
County, Utah; however it would be prudent to exhaust the administrative remedy and
request the refund from the Summit County Commission.
I will calculate the amount of refund request for two months from November, 1992,
and tax years 1993,1994,1995, and 1996. There were substantial adjustments during some
of those years as to the assessment valuation.
We were awaiting the outcome of the case before the Third Judicial District Court
and the Utah Supreme Court appeal, which is adverse to out-of-state property owners who
have second homes in Utah which do not qualify as primary residencies. During the course
of that action, upon reading the depositions of the Summit County Assessor, I then
understood that although Jeffrey Katzenburg did not qualify as a Utah resident, that Bret
Anderson did, and that Bret Anderson's residency qualified the home, although he is not the
owner.
Calculate the amount of refund and get approval to pursue the matter.
Summit County has won the main battle with out-of-state owners and preserved the
$37 million at issue. Our situation will be a very limited situation and should not meet with
nearly as much resistance from the Summit County Commission.
Steve Martin said he would write me a letter confirming the Summit County
Assessor's position and response to my March 12, 1997 letter.
MSM

Barbara J.
Assessor

SUMMIT COUNTY COUHT M O U » *

MiloMarsden
Fifth Floor
68 South main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RE: Primary Resident status on lots 7 & 8, Bald Eagle Club @ Deer Valley
Dear Mr. Marsden;
Pursuant to our conversation of April 17,1997,1 will change the status of these two
properties to Primary Residential based on the approved applications you submitted on February
3,1997. The current reduction in assessed value is 45% at the writing of this letter.
The power to grant refunds based on the change in status for years previous to the current
tax year does not rest with the Assessor. The Assessor can make changes in value for the current
tax year (1997) only. All other matters of tax dollars, errors etc. are dealt with by the County
Commissioners. It is my understanding that they would be reticent to grant refunds for prior years
if the taxpayer had not filed their exemption application at some point in the past nor corrected
the error through the Board of Equalization during the years in question.

Sr. Staff Appraiser
Summit County Assesor's Office

RECEIVE*
PO. BOX 128 • COALVILLE. UTAH 84017
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October 31, 1996

CERTIFIED MAIL
Glen C Thompson
Summit County Treasurer
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017-0128
Re: Payment of 1996 Property Taxes Under Protest
Dear Mr. Thompson:
A. EL, Ino, a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer
Valley. The corporation is sending you a check in the amount of $40,872.00 in payment of
the 1996 property taxes on the property known as Unit, The Bald Eagle Chib at Deer Valley
Utah. The account number is 0266118.
The corporation believes that 45 percent of the taxes assessed against this parcel are
unlawful and unconstitutional because the property has not been given the benefit of the
residential property tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the county
and state.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-1327,45 percent of the
total 1996 taxes due are paid under protest.
Sincerely,
A- E, INC
a Utah Corporation

By

October 31,1996

CERTfflEP MAIL
Glen C Thompson
Summit County Treasurer
P.O. Box 128
Coalvffle, UT 84017-0128
Re: Payment of 1996 Property Taxes Under Protest
Dear Mr. Thompson:
A. IL, Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 8, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer
Valley. The corporation is sending you a check in the amount of $7,368.65 in payment of
the 1996 property taxes on the property known as Unit, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley
Utah. The account number is 0266126.
The corporation believes that 45 percent of the taxes assessed against this parcel are
unlawful and unconstitutional because the property has not been given the benefit of the
residential property tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the county
and state.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-1327,45 percent of the
total 1996 taxes due are paid under protest
Sincerely,
A R, INC
a Utah Corporation

By

October 31, 1995

ggRTIf IBP HTO
Glen C. Thompson
Summit County Treasurer
P.O. Box 128
C o a l v i l l e , OT 84017-0128
Re:

Payment of 19*5 Property Taxes Under P r o t e s t

Dear Mr. Thompson:
A. B . , I n c . , a Utah corporation, i s the owner of Unit 8, The
Bald Eagle Club a t Deer Valley. The corporation i s sending you a
check i n t h e amount of $7,117.60 i n payment of t h e 1995 property
t a x e s on t h e property known as Unit 8, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer
V a l l e y Utah, The account number i s 0266126.
The corporation b e l i e v e s t h a t 45% of the t a x e s assessed
a g a i n s t t h i s p a r c e l are unlawful and unconstitutional because the
property has not been given the b e n e f i t of the r e s i d e n t i a l property
t a x exemption t h a t i s given t o other r e s i d e n t i a l property in the
county and s t a t e .
Accordingly, pursuant t o Utah Code Annotated, Section 5 9 - 2 1327, 45% of t h e t o t a l 1995 taxes due are paid under p r o t e s t .
Sincerely,
A. E. INC.
a Utah Corporation

By

October 31, 1995

CgRTtFIBP Will
Glen C. Thompson
Summit County Treasurer
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, DT 84017-0128
Re:

Payment of 1995 Property Taxes Under Protest

Dear Mr. Thompson:
A. E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a
check in the amount of $44,333.79 in payment of the 1995 property
taxes on the property known as Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer
Valley Utah, The account number is 0266118.
The corporation believes that 45% of the taxes assessed
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the
county and state.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-21327, 45% of the total 1995 taxes due are paid under protest.
Sincerely,
A. E. INC.
a Utah Corporation

By

October 31, 1994

CERTIFIBD MAIL
Glen C. Thompson
Summit County Treasurer
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017-0128
Re:

Payment of 1994 Property Taxes Under Protest

Dear Mr. Thompson:
A.E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a
check in the amount of $26,844.59 in payment of the 1994 property
taxes on the property known as Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer
Valley Utah. The account number is 0266118.
The corporation believes that 29.50% of the taxes assessed
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the
county and state.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-21327, 29.50% of the total 1994 taxes due are paid under protest.
Sincerely,
A.E., Inc.
a Utah Corporation

October 31, 1994

CERTIFIED MAIL
Glen C. Thompson
Summit County Treasurer
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017-0128
Re:

Payment of 1994 Property Taxes Under Protest

Dear Mr. Thompson:
A.E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 8, The
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a
check in the amount of $6,440.96 in payment of the 1994 property
taxes on the property known as Unit 8, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer
Valley Utah. The account number is 0266126.
The corporation believes that 29.50% of the taxes assessed
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the
county and state.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-21327, 29.50% of the total 1994 taxes due are paid under protest.
Sincerely,
A.E., Inc.
a Utah Corporation

By

October 21, 1993

CERTIFIED MAIL
Glen G. Thompson
Summit County Treasurer
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017-0128
Re:

Payment of 1993 Property Taxes Under Protest

A. E., Inc., a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 8, the
Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley. The corporation is sending you a
check in the amount of $26,320.85 in payment of the 1993 property
taxes for the property located at Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at
Deer Valley, Utah. The account number is 0266118.
The corporation believes that 29.50% of the taxes assessed
against this parcel are unlawful and unconstitutional because the
property has not been given the benefit of the residential property
tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the
county and state.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-21327, 29.50% of the total 1993 taxes due are paid under protect.
Sincerely,
A. E. INC.
a Utah Corporation
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
David L. Thomas, #7106
Deputy Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. 0. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorneys for Summit County

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
STATE OF UTAH

A.E., INC.,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD
OF EQUALIZATION,
DEFENDANT.

MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
SAID MOTION AND IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION REGARDING
JURISDICTION
Case No. 99-0257
(The Honorable Jane Phan)

COMES NOW the Defendant, the Summit County Board of Equalization, by and
through its counsel of record, and moves the Utah State Tax Commission to dismiss Plaintiffs
Appeal and submits the foregoing Memorandum in Support of said Motion to Dismiss and in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction.

RECEIVED
JUL 1 9 \m

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff is an owner of real property in Summit County, Utah.

(Plaintiffs

Memorandum, pp. 1, para. 3).
2. Plaintiff filed a letter with the Summit County Treasurer in each tax year, 1993 1996, asserting payment of property taxes under protest. (Plaintiffs Exhibit A).
3. Plaintiff claims that he should have been given a residential property tax exemption
for the subject real property. (Plaintiffs Memorandum, pp. 2-3, Summary of Facts).
4. Plaintiff neverfiledan application or affidavit for a residential property tax exemption
with Summit County, as required by Utah Code Ann. Title 59, Part 11, nor did Plaintiff ever
provide any evidence that he qualified for the residential property tax exemption during tax years
1992 - 1996. (Summit County Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Barbara J. Kresser, County Assessor).
5. Summit County enacted a Resolution, dated June 9, 1992, which allowed tax refunds
to property owners who had inadvertently failed to file an appropriate application for residential
property tax exemption with Summit County, so long as adequate evidence of primary residential
status was supplied to the County. This was passed as a one-time tax amnesty for prior tax
years 1987-1991. Thereafter, the Board of Commissioners made known that it would no longer
accept late applications for residential property tax exemptions. (Summit County Exhibit 2,
Resolution, dated June 9, 1992).
6. Summit County enacted Ordinance 319, on September 22, 1997, which adopted in
more detail the guidance on residential property tax exemptions provided by the Utah State Tax

2

Commission. Ordinance 319 also reaffirmed the Board of Commissioner's position that a
property owner must apply for a residential property tax exemption and carry the burden of
proof in showing primary residential status. (Summit County Exhibit 3, Summit County
Ordinance 319).
7. On February 3, 1997, Plaintiff submitted an application for residential property tax
exemption to Summit County. Thereafter, on April 17, 1997, Plaintiff was granted residential
property tax exempt status for tax year 1997 and thereafter. (Summit County Exhibit 4, Letter
of Steve Martin, Sr. Staff Appraiser).
8.

On August 14, 1997, the Board of Commissioners, sitting as the Board of

Equalization, denied Plaintiffs request for a property tax refund for tax years 1992 - 1996,
citing the failure of Plaintiff to properly request a residential property tax exemption in each of
those years. (Summit County Exhibit 5, Letter of Barbara J. Kresser, County Assessor).
9. Nearly a year later, on July 16, 1998, Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Utah
State Tax Commission. (See Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal).
ARGUMENT
U.C.A. Title 59, Part 11, governs the issuance of property tax exemptions. It requires
that
[t]he owner who receives exempt status for property, if required
by the commission, shall file an affidavit, on or before March 1
each year, certifying the use to which the property has been placed
during the past year. The affidavit shall contain the following
information in summary form:

3

(i) identity of affiant;
(ii) the basis of the affiant's knowledge of the use
of the property;
(iii) authority to make the affidavit on behalf of the
owner;
(iv) county where property is located; and
(v) nature of use of the property.
U.C.A. 59-2-1101(3)(a). The Tax Commission has required such an affidavit by rule. (Summit
County Exhibit 6, Utah State Tax Commission, Property Tax Administration Standards of
Practice [hereinafter, "Standard of Practice"], Standard of Practice #2.13 (June 1999)). See also
R884-24P-35 (Annual Affidavit of Exempt Use); R884-24P-52 (Definition of Primary
Residence). Summit County has adopted similar rules. (See Summit County Exhibits 2 & 3).
This is consistent with U.C.A. 59-2-1102 wherein the legislature set forth a statutory process
for determination of property tax exemptions. The burden is clearly placed upon the property
owner to prove to the Board of Equalization that the criteria for the exemption is established.
An application, verified by oath, is a requirement. U.C.A. 59-2-1102(3); Standard of Practice
II. 1, General Information.
Appeals from decisions of the Board of Equalization on property tax exemption matters
must be filed with the Utah State Tax Commission within thirty (30) days. U.C.A. 59-21102(7); 59-2-1006(1). There is no statutory provision allowing waiver of this thirty (30) day
statute of limitations for appeals.
In the case sub judice, Plaintiff did not appeal the decision of the Summit County Board
of Equalization within thirty (30) days to the Utah State Tax Commission. Instead, Plaintiff

4

waited nearly one (1) year. Consequently, this Commission does not have jurisdiction over this
matter, as it is time-barred.
Additionally, Plaintiff is time-barred by operation of law in that he failed to apply for the
property tax exemption in each, or for that matter any, of the taxable years 1992 - 1996. The
payment under protest provisions of the Utah Tax Code are inapplicable to property tax
exemptions. The clear intent of the legislature is that one must file an application and prove the
exemption before it can be received. Merely asserting under protest a property tax exemption
is not within the intent or plain language of the statute. In fact, to allow such would frustrate
Utah Tax Law by allowing individuals to avoid the statutory and regulatory application process
for determinations of property tax exempt status.1

1

Plaintiff has asserted that he is allowed to pay under
protest in accordance with U.C.A. 59-2-1328. However, U.C.A. 59-21327 limits such to allegations of unlawful taxation. Where an
individual taxpayer has not applied for a tax exemption, it can
hardly be asserted that the tax is unlawful. The proper tax
status does not change until an exemption is granted.t Furthermore,
the statute of limitations on payments under protest is four (4)
years, making Plaintiff's own argument for tax years 1992 - 1995
moot. Stevensen v. Monson, 856 P. 2d 355 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); U.C.A. 78-12-25.
5

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Summit County Board of Equalization requests that the
Utah State Tax Commission dismiss Plaintiffs Appeal as being time-barred.
DATED this V^day of July, 1999.
Respectfully Submitted,
ROBERT W. ADKINS
Summit County Attorney
DAVID L. THOMAS
Deputy Summit County Attorney

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this f°i day of

, 1999,1 caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support of Said Motion
and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction to be sent via United States
mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Counsel for Plaintiff
Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
David L. Thomas, #7106
Deputy Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. 0. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorneys for Summit County

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
STATE OF UTAH

A.E..INC,

:
PLAINTIFF,

AFFIDAVIT OF
BARBARA J. KRESSER

:

VS.

:

SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD
OF EQUALIZATION,
DEFENDANT.

:

Case No. 99-0257
(The Honorable Jane Phan)

I, Barbara J. Kresser, being duly sworn, state that I am the County Assessor, Summit
County, State of Utah. I have acted in this capacity since January 7, 1991.

l

1. It is my official public duty to keep the records regarding property tax exemptions for
Summit County, which includes all property tax exemption applications and affidavits. All
property tax exemption applications and affidavits are promptly filed after receipt. All
property tax exemption applications and affidavits are acted upon by the County Assessor and
Board of Equalization in a timely manner during the regular course of official public duties
as proscribed by statute and the rules of the Utah State Tax Commission. The documentation
of such actions constitute official acts of the Board of Equalization and carries the force of
law within Summit County.

2. All original property tax exemption applications and affidavits are kept as official public
records of the County under U.C.A., Sections 78-25-3 and 78-25-4, and as such, are open to
public inspection.

3. As the County Assessor, I am the official custodian of all property tax exemption
documents, to include all applications and affidavits for property tax exempt status, and have
personal knowledge of all official acts of the Board of Equalization.

4. I certify that I have researched all records in the County Assessor's Office pertaining to
Units 7 & 8, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No.s BEC-7 & BEC-8), which are
the subject of this Appeal, and can find no record of an application or affidavit for a

2

residential property tax exemption being filed in tax years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, or 1996.
In fact, the first evidence of such an application or affidavit being filed with the County
Assessor is in February 1997.

5. I have had several opportunities to communicate with Plaintiff concerning the matter
which has been appealed. On August 11, 1997, the Summit County Board of Equalization
denied Plaintiffs request for a property tax fund for tax years 1992 - 1996 because Plaintiff
failed to comply with the statutory and Utah State Tax Commission Standards of Practice in
failing to properly applied for a residential property tax exemption during those taxable
years. This has been explained repeatedly to Plaintiff by Summit County.

3

I declare, under penalty of perjury, that I am the below named person and that the
foregoing information and facts as described in this document are true, complete and correct
to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Q&AJ^OSl+^r

Date

State of Utah
Summit County

h

BARBARA /. KRESSER

)
) ss.
)

Subscribed
Subscribe and sworn to before me by BARBARA J. KRESSER on t h i s / ^ day of
, 1999.

Jq/i, V-

l
f<
' Public
IONN1E A. DAWSON
60 U. Mat. P.O. Box 12b
Coatv; le, Utah 64017
My Commission Expire*
December 18, 200C

T
I
i
J
•
I

State «f Uttfi

J

s77?s7//

'/fame?

Ldnnie A. Dawson
Notary Public in and for the State
of Utah
Residing in Coalville, Utah
My commission expires: /£~/%~dJ(D
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Exhibit "_L

RESOLUTION NO,
A RESOLUTION SETTING GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS ON PROPERTY
TAX REFUNDS TO QUALIFIED PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL TAX PAYERS
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has determined that
equitable considerations require differential tax refunds to
those certain tax payers who qualified for "primary residential
exemptions", but who paid "secondary residential rate" taxes;
and,
WHEREAS, the Summit County Commission has further determined
that such differential refun'ds should only be distributed within
strict guidelines and to qualified tax payers only,
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED pursuant to the authorization
of U.C.A. 59-2-1321, that the County Assessor and County
Treasurer are hereby directed and authorized to make differential
refunds as follows:
1.

Refunds may be made of the difference between taxes

actually paid at the secondary rate which should have been paid
at the primary residential rate.
2.

Applications shall only be considered for such partial

refund of taxes paid during tax years 1987 thru 1991 inclusive.
Applications will only be accepted until 5:00 p.m. August 31,
1992; thereafter only current year applications will be accepted
or processed.
3.

Applications for refunds must be accompanied by

satisfactory and verifiable proof of primary residency status

during each year the refund is claimed.

Such items as voter

registrations, school registrations, state and federal income tax
returns, drivers licenses, telephone and utility listings, etc.
may be accepted as evidence of residency status.
4.

Applications for refunds will only be received or

accepted from individual tax payers or the tax payer's attorneyat-law or an attorney-in-fact possessing regularly executed and
recorded general or special powers of attorney for the tax payer.
5.

Applications for refunds shall be made to the Assessor's

Office.

Any and all refunds shall be made as quickly as possible

and shall not bear interest.
6.

Applicants who are denied refunds may appeal such denial

to the Summit County Commission.
PASSED AND ADOPTED this V*

day of June, 1992.

SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSION:
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SUMMIT COUNTY
ORDINANCE NO. 3 \ S
AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR A PROCEDURE
'AND CRITERIA IN GRANTING RESIDENTIAL
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS
PREAMBLE
WHEREAS, the Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2(8), and U.C.A. 59-2102(22) & 103(2) (1953), as amended, provide that a "residential exemption" to property tax
of 45% is available for "primary residences;" and,
WHEREAS, neither the State Code, nor Utah State Tax Commission rules, provide a
definition of "primary residence," except to state that a "transient residential use or
condominiums used in rental pools" are not considered primary residences; and,
WHEREAS, Utah Code, Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 11, discusses property tax
exemptions in general, but is silent as to the "residential exemption;" and,
WHEREAS, Utah Code, Title 59, Chapter 2, Part 11, provides for an exemption
application process, which includes the filing of an affidavit, prior to the granting of a
property tax exemption; and,
WHEREAS, U.C.A. 59-2-1101(4) & 1102(1) state that "[t]he county legislative body
may adopt rules to effecuiate the exemptions provided" and may "determine whether certain
property within the county is exempt from taxation;" and,
WHEREAS, U.C.A. 59-2-1001 stditts that the County "may make and enforce any
rule which is consistent with statute and commission rule, and necessary for the government
of the [B]oard [of Equalization], the preservation of order and the transaction of business;"
and,
WHEREAS, in recognition of the diverse varieties of property ownership in Summit
County a proper procedure for granting "residential exemptions" and defining the criteria
allowing for such grants needs to be established; and,
WHEREAS, it is the opinion of the County Commission that residency should be
determined by the quality and quantity of the actual occupancy and not by the class of
structure, nor the intended use of the structure; and,
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WHEREAS, providing for a standardized procedure and criteria to grant "residential
exemptions" to property tax, where the State Code and State Tax Commission are silent, is
in the best interests of Summit County;
NOW THEREFORE, the County Legislative Body of the County of Summit, the
State of Utah, ordains as follows:
Section 1.

Procedure.

A. A property owner or his/her designee (applicant) shall submit an application for
residential exemption from property taxes to the Summit County Assessor no latter
than May 22 of the current tax year. An application shall be in the form of an
affidavit and shall contain, at a minimum, the following information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

property identification (serial number, address, etc.),
identity of the applicant/affiant,
basis of the applicant/affiant's knowledge of the use of the property;
authority to make the affidavit on behalf of the owner (if applicable),
county where property is located, and
nature of use of the property.

B. In the event that an affidavit is not timely filed, an exemption may be granted by
the Board of Equalization on an individual appeal basis for the current tax year only.
At the close of the Board of Equalization, no further appeals for exemptions will be
considered until the following tax year.
C. A new affidavit of primary residence must be filed when ownership or the status
of habitancy changes. Any misrepresentation on the affidavit subjects the owner to a
penalty equal to the tax on the property's value.
D. Submission of the affidavit authorizes the Summit County Assessor to request or
collect information sufficient to verify primary residence status.
E. If an applicant requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the
residential exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the
property serves as a primary residence. The burden of proof shall remain at all times
with the applicant.
Section 2.

Criteria.

A. A primary residence is the principal place where one (property owner or
inhabitant) actually lives as distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though
motels and other transient properties would not meet this definition, rentals (on a
yearly basis) would qualify for the residential property tax exemption.
2

B. A primary residence shall be defined by the following factors with respect to the
property owner / property inhabitant (claimant):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

(12)
(13)
(14)

(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)

an approved application for residential exemption,
the presence of the claimant on the voter registry in the area claimed as
a primary residence,
the length of continuous residency in the place claimed as a primary
residence,
the nature and quality of the living accommodations at the claimed
primary residence,
the presence of family members at the claimed primary residence,
the place of residence of the claimant's spouse,
the physical location of the claimant's place of business or sources of
income,
the physical location of the claimant's banking facilities,
the location of registration of claimant's vehicles, boats, and RVs,
claimant's membership in clubs, churches, and other social
organizations;
the claimant's addresses used on such things as:
(a)
telephone listings,
(b)
mail,
(c)
state and federal tax returns,
(d)
listings in official government publications or other
correspondence,
(e)
driver's license,
(f)
voter registration, and
(g)
tax rolls,
the location of public schools attended by the claimant or his/her
dependents,
the nature and payment of taxes in other states,
declarations of the claimant:
(a)
communicated to third parties,
(b)
contained in deeds,
(c)
contained in insurance policies,
(d)
contained in wills,
(e)
contained in letters,
(f)
contained in registers,
(g)
contained in mortgages, and
(h)
contained in leases,
the exercise of civil or political rights in a given location,
the failure to obtain permits and licenses normally required of a
resident of the area,
the purchase of a burial plot in a particular location, and
the acquisition of a new residence in a different location.
3

C. Where a property owner owns more than one residence in Utah, or elsewhere,
none of which are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a
primary residence for purposes of the residential property tax exemption. Only the
residence which is occupied more than six months out of the year qualifies for the
residential exemption.
D. Married couples may only claim one property as a primary residence except
where separate residences are maintained and occupied under a court approved
separation agreement.
E. Partial or incomplete homes, as of January 1 of the tax year, will not be given the
residential exemption until the following year when the full market value is placed on
the county tax assessment roll, a certificate of occupancy has been issued by the
county, and the completed structure is occupied by a full time resident. It is the
occupancy that qualifies the property for the exemption.
F. To qualify for the residential exemption, a property need not be property owner
occupied. Apartments and other rental housing used as a primary residence (property
inhabitant) qualify for the residential exemption upon accepted application in
accordance with Section 1 above and paragraph B of this Section.
G. The residential exemption is limited to up to one acre of land per residential
dwelling unit on a single property description.
Section 3.

Grandfather Provision.

As of the effective date of this Ordinance, property owners whose Summit County
property is currently listed by the County Assessor as having a residential exemption
shall not be required to file an application and affidavit to continue its status.
However, should ownership or the property inhabitant's status change, the property
shall no longer be considered exempt and an application and affidavit under the
provisions of this Ordinance shall apply.
Section 4.

Conflict,

In the event of any conflict between this Ordinance and State or Federal law, the
provisions of the latter shall be controlling.
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Section 5.

Savings Clause.

In the event one or more of the provisions of this Ordinance shall, for any reason, be
held to be unenforceable or invalid in any respect under any applicable laws, such
unenforceability or invalidity shall not affect any other provision; and in such an
event, this Ordinance shall be construed as if such unenforceable or invalid provision
had never beeft contained herein.
Section 6.

Effective Date.

This Ordinance shall become effective after publication of such in accordance with
applicable State law.
APPROVED, ADOPTED, AND PASSED and ordered published by the
Summit County Board of Commissioners, this 22^ day of5gnWSc*r 1997.
BOARDbF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Chairman
Commissioner Soter voted:
Commissioner Richins voted:
Commissioner Schifferli voted:

Coiinty Clerk
Summit County, Utah
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Deputy County Attorney
Summit County, Utah
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MiloMarsden
Fifth Roor
68 South main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RE: Primary Resident status on lots 7 & 8, Bald Eagle Club @ Deer Valley
Dear Mr. Marsden;
Pursuant to our conversation of April 17,1997,1 will change the status of these two
properties to Primary Residential based on the approved applications you submitted on February
3,1997. The current reduction in assessed value is 45% at the writing of this letter.
The power to grant refunds based on the change in status for years previous to the current
tax year does not rest with the Assessor. The Assessor can make changes in value for the current
tax year (1997) only. All other matters of tax dollars, errors etc. are dealt with by the County
Commissioners. It is my understanding that they would be reticent to grant refunds for prior years
if the taxpayer had notfiledtheir exemption application at some point in the past nor corrected
the error through the Board of Equalization during the years in question.

Si Staff Appraise^
Summit County AssesotJ i Uthce

Exhibit"

service member is stationed out of I lull, bit! llif pasniiu] | n opr ii\ mina
is not exempt from property tax.

i, I he propeii »'

2.123 Personal Property of Non-Utah Residents Stationed in Utah. Personal property
owned by non-Utah residents who are members of the armed forces and stationed under military
orders in Utah is exemptfromproperty tax. The assessor may rely on a letterfromthe
commanding officer or other documentation verifying out-of-state residency and military orders
assigning the service member to Utah. For example, if the non-Utah resident service member
owned a non-commercial mobile home in Utah, the property would be exempt. (50 USC 574)

Standard of Practice 2.13
Primary Residential Exemption
2.13.0 Primary Residential Exemption. Utah law requires assessors to exempt from
taxation 45% of the fair market value of residential property. [Section 59-2-130(2)] Utah Code
Annotated Section 59-2-102(22) and rule R884-24P-52 define residential property, for purposes
of the exemption, to be a primary residence. A primary residence does not include property used
for transient residential use, or condominiums used in rental pools. [Utah State Constitution,
Article XIII, Section 2(8), (59-2-103)]
Io qualify, a property7 need not be owner occupied. Apartments and other rental housing
used as a primary residence qualify for the exemption. The assessor shall grant the residential
exemption to the first one acre of land, if listed in the same parcel description. The property
owner has the burden of proving that property qualifies for the exemption,
Guideli nes:
•

A "primary residence" is the principal place where one actually lives as
distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though motel and other
transient properties would not meet this definition, typical student housing, used
by renters during the school year (more than six months), would qualify for the
exemption.

•

If a person requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the
exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the property
serves as the person's primary residence. If the person's address on the Utah
driver's license and/or voter registration is in a county different from that of the
property location address, the county wn : . the application is made should notify
the other county assessor.

•

Where a person or persons own more than one residence in 'Utah, none of which
are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a primary
residence. Only 'the residence which is occupied more than six months out of the
year qualifies for the exemption.

Barbara J-Kreiser

(909
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August 14, 1997
Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson, & Bell, L.L.C.
Fifth Floor •
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah B4101
Dear Mr. Marsden:
Kent Jones, the Summit County Clerk, has asked that I respond to
your letter dated July 17, 1997, regarding the two lots in Bald
Eagle Club at Deer Valley identified as BEC-7 and BEC-8.
Mr. Jones met with the Board of County Commissioners during their
regular work meeting August 11, 1997 and discussion was held on
your request. It was their decision to deny any refund of taxes on
these parcels. As has been explained before, it is the policy of
Summit County not to make refunds on previous years.
Summit County (as well as the State Tax Commission) takes the
position that the primary exemption is an exemption and must be
applied for. This exemption will be granted for the current year
if it is found that the request meets the established criteria.
Sincerely,

Barbara J . d r e s s e r
Summit County Assessor

AUG 18 897

or\
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November 2 1 , 1997

CERTIFIED MAIL
Barbara J. Kresser, Assessor
Summit County, State of Utah
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017
Dear Ms. Kresseri
This is a follow-up to our October 27, 1997 telephone
conversation.
I appreciate receiving a copy of the Summit County
Commission's resolution entitled, H A Resolution Setting
Guidelines and Limitations on Property Tax Refunds to Qualified
Primary Residential Taxpayers." It is dated June 9, 1992.
I also spoke with Dave Thomas concerning exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
What I need to know, is whether the Summit County Commission
has made a final determination on my September 2, 1997 letter to
you. Specifically, I would like to know if the Summit County
Commission will grant my client, A.E., Inc., relief for failure
to give residential exemption on Units 7 and 8, Bald Eagle Club
at Deer Valley, for the years 1992 through 1996. Those taxes
were paid under protest claiming the primary residential
exemption. A work sheet of tax difference between the primary
residential exemption and the secondary tax status is attched
hereto and totals $70,182.79.
I would appreciate a hearing before the Summit County
Commission to get their final determination.
PS Form 3 8 0 0 .
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

A.E., INC.,
Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS
Appeal No. 99-0257

v.
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION,
SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Judge: Phan

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 20,1999, Respondent filed in this matter a Motion to Dismiss on the basis
that Petitioner failed to timely file its appeal before the State Tax Commission. Petitioner had
submitted a Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction on July 9,1999, and submitted a Response to
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss and in Further Support of Plaintiffs Memorandum Regarding
Jurisdiction on August 9,1999.
Petitioner owns real property in Summit County and for the years 1992 through 1996
Petitioner was denied the primary residential exemption for such property. For each of these years
Petitioner paid the tax with a letter stating that the payment was made under protest as Petitioner was
entitled to the exemption. Petitioner did not file an affidavit, nor provide any evidence that it
qualified for the residential property tax exemption. In addition. Petitioner apparently did not file
an appeal of the exemption status with the Summit County Board of Equalization for the years in
question. For the 1997 tax year Petitioner filed the appropriate application and affidavit and was
granted the primary residential exemption. Petitioner then filed a refund request with the County for
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the 1992 through 1996 tax years. According to Respondent's attorney the Summit County Board of
Commissioners,, acting as the Board of Equalization, denied the request on August 14,1997. This
denial was communicated to Petitioner by letter from Barbara Kresser, Summit County Assessor.
Petitioner did not file an appeal of the decision to the State Tax Commission until July 1998.
Petitioner argues that this is not an appeal from an adverse exemption ruling with the
30 day limitation period allowed under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1102(7). Instead Petitioner indicates
that this is an action for refund of taxes unlawfully and erroneously assessed which it paid under
protest annually and Petitioner asserts that it is entitled to bring this action before the State Tax
Commission under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1328l or §59-2-1321.
The Tax Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal in either instance.2
Petitioner did not comply with the administrative remedies of timely filing an appeal with the County
Board of Equalization annually within thirty days from the date of the property tax notices and then
timely filing an appeal annually with the State Tax Commission pursuant to the Utah Code Ann.

1

This provision does not support Petitioner's claim as it
merely details how payment is to be made if a refund is ordered.
It is presumably read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. §59-21327 which indicates the procedure for obtaining an order of
refund.
:

See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n, 870 P.2d 291, 293
(Utah App. 1994). In Blaine Hudson the court stated, "A taxpayer
faced with an allegedly erroneous assessment ordinarily has two
statutory methods of challenging the ensuing tax. First, Utah
Code Ann. §§59-2-1004, -1005 (1992) provide that the taxpayer can
file an administrative appeal with the County Board of
Equalization. Second, Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301(1992) authorizes
the taxpayer to pay under protest and seek to recover the tax
paid in an action brought in district court."
-2-
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§59-2-1006. Petitioner's appeal to the State Tax Commission nearly one year later is untimely.
U{ah Code Ann. §59-2-1327 provides that a taxpayer who claims the tax is unlawful
can pay the taxes under protest, as Petitioner did for the years at issue, and then file an action in
district court. A similar remedy is provided in Utah Code Ann. §59-1-31)1, which again specifically
states that the action is to be filed in district court.
Petitioner also argues that the Tax Commission has jurisdiction to hear the appeal
under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1321. Petitioner is incorrect. This section provides that the county
legislative body can order a refund for property that "has been either erroneously or illegally
assessed." The statute, however, does not provide for an appeal of the county's decision to the State
Tax Commission. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the Tax Commission does not have
jurisdiction to review the County's decision on a §59-2-1321 claim and has suggested that the
appropriate body to review the County's decision was the district court.3
PRD5R
Based upon the Commission's review of the motion and consideration of the parties'
positions, the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
DATED this

&

day of

J ^ £ ^ £ ^ >

^

1999.

%4kL
Jaie Phan V
Administrative Law Judae

3

See Blame Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n. 870 P.2d 291,294
(1994) .

Appeal No. 99-0257

BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION.
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision.

A

DATED this.

^

^Z

day of.

1999.

j j ^ )ui^(L,oc«Jk^L.
lchard B McKfcown
Chairman

Pam Hendrickson
Commissioner

/^*C0iW4>X

•«r/
ABSENT*

R. Bruce Johnson
Commissioner

VUUMUH

.'S.

/«/<.

JU/ZJL^

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner

Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for
Reconsideradon must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq.

JKP/99'02S7.di$

•4-
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C E K T I F I C A T E
Utah State

A. E . ,

OP

M A I L I N G

Tax Commission
Appeal

Inc.
VS.

99-0257

Summit County BOE

A.E., Inc.,

Petitioner
c/o Milo Marsden
_
68 South Main Street, 5th floor
Salt Lake City
UT 84101
Frazier, Blake
Respondent

Summit County Auditor
P 0 Box 128
Coalville
UT 84017
Thomas, David
Attorney for

Respondent

Summit County Deputy Attorney
60 N. Main
P 0 Box 128
Coalville
UT 84017

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document
addressed to each of the above named parties.

/ft-.
Dace77

fr

^£^
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MELO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC
ATTORNEYS. FOR PLAINTIFF
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800
FAX NO.: (801) 537-1315

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

A.E^ INC
Plaintiff
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

Case No. 99-0257
(Judge Jane Phan)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-466-13, Petitioner alleges the following
points of law and fact which the Commission has overlooked or misapprehended:
1. Petitioner did provide evidence that it qualified for the residential property tax
exemption for the years 1992 through 1996. Petitioner has qualified for the residential
property tax since 1992. Petitioner paid the 1992-1996 taxes with a letter stating that
payment was made under protest and that petitioner qualified for the exemption.
Respondent did not request nor have an affidavit requirement until 1997. Petitioner
never received from respondent a denial of the refund request.
2. Petitioner urges the Commission to focus on Section 59-2-1328, which gives the
Commission jurisdiction in "any action" where a tax paid under protest was unlawfully

0083

collected. Thus, even if the Commission cannot order a refund, the Commission "sua
sponte" can adjust County assessments. Yes, we could file in the district court; however,
the Commission has jurisdiction sua sponte to adjust assessments of the counties. See
Section 59-1-210.
3. Lastly, a review of the Utah Constitution, Section 13, Section 2, and Utah
Code Sections 52-2-103 and 59-2-1100, etc reveals that the residential exemption is in the
Utah Constitution and in Section 59-1-103. On the other hand, the exemptions under
Section 59-2-1100 etc, which provide for affidavit and exemptions, does not include the
residential exemption. The residential exemption is self-contained and uses language
referring to "this part." In short, the affidavit provision is not part of the residential
exemption.
DATED this

IfrM- day of October, 1999.

Milo S. Ma/sden, Jr. ( /
MARSD^^AHOCHVGOTTFREDSON
& BELLTtlC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION to Robert W. Atkins, Summit County Attorney, and David L
Thon
Coalville, Utah 84017, this /&***

of October, 1999, postage prepaid

diet
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
A.E., INC.,

i
<*r,

l
i

l
)

v.

IIR1JI K U t . M M l III I OINSIDI II * I l i M

UJP'.'aiNo.

99-0257

)

BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
SUMMIT COUNTY,
UTAH,

N

-r—T—

Property Tax/Locally Assessed

)
)
)

Respondent.

,

0_

Phan

)

This matter came betbre the Utah State Tax Commission upon a Petition for
Reconsideration, dated October 21,1999, t ^ u ^ . . . . . .
order datt .

•

: >1

999.
APPLICABLE LAW

Utah Administrative Rule K801

1 -iy) provides

IIMI A

\hi\\\\u\x I

KfMui'.uk'ntiun

, oufiiis for reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery of new
:der tMs rule, the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying
i. a tor Reconsideration.

Upon review of the arguments set out in Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration,
-ilthough Petitioner disagree;) uih ill - I'nrniir .MI "
i ill fii, iii? ill i ill I if ni in 11 i.iii'

*u

I m i Id indicate a m i s t a k e in law or fact sufficient for t h e C o m m i s s i o n to r e c o n s i d e r

RECEIVED
DEC 9 1999

Appeal N , ^ 99-0257

its final order.
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order «n! iho Utah Male l a x
i 'iiiiiim .' i in Illiiil llic I'l'iiii in Inii Ihn unuilenniin is ilnin-'il III i .11 nii!ni"ill
DATED this

. £mt

..day of

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH ii'l A1L J AX LUMM1SS1UN.

(xvw * ' M I
Pam Hendrickson
Commissioner

R. Bruce Johns^*
Commission^''

Palmer D e p a u i i s
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of 1
order pursuant tolJtah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et seq.
jKP/99^2S7.rec
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;e Tax Conur^.^
Appeal

S
Summit County BOE

Petitioner
c/o Milo Marsden
68 South Main Street, 5th floor
Salt Lake City
UT 84101
Frazier, slake
Respondent
Summit County Auditor
P O Box 128
Coalville
ii r n in I ,
"
Thomas, David
Attorney for
Respondent
Summit County Deputy Attorney
60 N. Main
F 0 Box 128
Coalville
UT 8^

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of t:he £oregoi i: Ig ::ioci 11 i iei It
addressed to each of the above named parties.
/

t^/k

Date

Ku.

FILED
DEC 2 2 1999
Third Oistfiot Court

*r

Deputy Clerk, Summit Couirity

MILO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC
A T T O R N E Y S F O R PLAINTIFF
68 S O U T H MAIN STREET, FIFTII I U »i )R
SALT LAKE CITY, U T A H 84101
T E L E P H O N E : (801) 521-3800

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, TAX DIVISION, STATE. OI L I AH

A, L., INC.!., ii Ut.ill I orporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.

'v

A.

tmLbMus PK

SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION
S U M M I T C O U N T Y B O A R D OF
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT
C O U N T Y ASSESSOR; and SUMMI'
COUNTY TREASURER,
Defendants.

. w..*pidi;45 w*: ^ i c u a n t s am!
PARTIES
Plaintiff, A, I... lint", ,i Utah corporation, for cause of action against u u u . j a i
alleges:
]

Plaintiff owns real property in Summit County, Utah described as follows:
I Ji lit 7, thr Bull! 1'jifli I 1iil> it !><vi V illn, (Sen ill No.
BEC

jy

Unit 8, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No.

00?:)

2. During the years 1992 through 1996, Defendants denied Plaintiff the primary
•"^'dential exemption for such property.
3 For each of these years, Plaintiff paid'the tax with a i^"-* ~ -r^e that the
pa) iiierit was made under protest as Plaintiff was em** u ,., ^.L %.Aunptk:ii. ,\ sample of
the ai mi lal lettei is attached as Exhibit" !!! ".
4 For the 1997 tax year, Defendants provided'Plaintiff with a form entitled
Summit County Allulavj

.

*

d

and filed. A copy is attached a^ Fxhfmt "B".
•c/endants granted Viaiaixt: ,r,v. primary residential exemption Ini ."i> I1
pron- -*v -n i997.
Plaintiff filed a refund request with Defendants for the 1992 through 1996 tax
;; <•*

n

classification,

-':

•

\

:--•'-"

i

me non-primary

\ ,'^p) *>t -he $70,182.79 worksheet ot i;i\ ditterence is attached as Exhibit

"C".
/. According to the Summit County Attorney, the Summit County Board of
Commissioners, acting as u^ ik-ui^ * * ». nuau/au-^, ,*.,,,,: -.. .*.*],.t v.
1997.
8. On June 30, 1998, Plaintiff appealed the Board of Commissioners Jailure to
riiiiiii I ii i lli! I ll ili Si,iif 1 ni * ( ViiiiiiiihMi in.
9. On October 6, 1999, the Utah State Tax Commission dismissed the appeal,

2

I-,

stating that
Utah Code Ann., Section 59-2-1327 provides that a taxpayer
who claims the tax is unlawful can pay the taxes under
protest, as the Petitioner did for the years at issue, and then
file an action in district court.
A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit "D"
10 Plaintiff' filed a Request for Reconsideration on October 15, 1999. A copy is
itti iched as Exhibit "E".
I I | I,,, D^cnnbei {K l^w, lln I I'l.ili Stair lax ( nmirnssiiMi issun) its Oniei
Deri)1 ing Reconsideration, A copy is attached as Exhibit "F".
1 2 I 'laintiff has exhausted its administi ati ' e i emedj ,
13B xhis is an action for refund of taxes unlawfully and erroneously assessed
which Plaintiff paid under protest annually.
• *

. Section 59-2-1327 and Section 59-1-301 (1992), a

taxp< f who claims the tax is uniawiui can pay the taxes under protest, as the Petitioner
f

.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants in the amount of
$ 70,182. / 9, ii iter est, reasonable altunit) Ires, eosi". ul

mil, am! genual iHit'f.

002.1

DATED this JMfTday of December, 1999.

Milo S. Maps^fen, Jr.
MARSDmOAHOON,
& BELL, LLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff

4

FREDSON

09.? I
EXHIBIT A

October 31,1996

CERTIFIED MAIL
Glen C Thompson
Summit County Treasurer
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017-0128
Re: Payment of 1996 Property Taxes Under Protest
Dear Mr. Thompson:
A. E^ Ino, a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Qub at Deer
Valley. The corporation is sending you a check in the amount of $40,872.00 in payment of
the 1996 property taxes on the property known as Unit, The Bald Eagle Qub at Deer Valley
Utah. The account number is 0266118.
The corporation believes that 45 percent of the taxes assessed against this parcel are
unlawful and unconstitutional because the property has not been given the benefit of the
residential property tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the county
and state.
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-1327,45 percent of the
total 1996 taxes due are paid under protest.
Sincerely,
A E., INC
a Utah Corporation

By
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EXHIBIT B

SUMMIT COUNTY
Affidavit Of Primary Residence
Pursuant to 59-2-103 UCA
I hereby certify that
1) ThetaocjtfBowner of the following described property (please print name, street address or
condominium unit number and mailing address).is:
A. E., Inc.,

a Utah Corporation

Serial*

BBCT7

Unit 7 The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley
c/o Milo S, Marsden, Jr.
68 South Main, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
2)

y^
of Bret Alan Anderson
j ^ has
The above described property is juy permanent, full time resideacj/andthaf MSPKno
other permanent residence either in the State of Utah or any other state.
Date of Occupancy

Noventoer 20, 1992
OR

I am leasing the above described property on a year round basis as of the
day of
,19
• Attached is a copy of the lease agreement and/or below is the
name and address of the person (s) the property is being leased to who use this property
as a primary residence.

I understand that pursuant to Utah Code 59-2-309 (2), that any misrepresentation of this affidavit
subjects the owner to severe penalties.
A.E. I n c . , a Utah
Signed J ^
Milo S. Marsfloft, Jr., Dsgad Counsel
Dated February 3,
Submission of this application authorizes the Assessor to request or collect information sufficient
to verify primary residence status. A listing of criteria used to determine residence status is
found on the back of this form.
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WORKSHEET OF TAX DIFFERENCE
(For Failure to Give Residential Exemption
Under § 59-2-103, Utah Code Annotated)

1996 Unit 7

$4,216,103

1996 Unit 8

$48,240.65

x45%

s:

$21,708.29

644,000

7,368.65

x45%

=

3,315.89

1995 Unit 7

3,488,103

44,333.79

x45%

=

19,950.21

1995 Unit 8

560,000

7,117.60

x45%

=

3,202.92

1994 Unit 7

1,641,068

26,844.59

x32%

=

8,590.27

1994 Unit 8

393,750

6,440.96

x32%

=

2,061.11

1993 Unit 7

1,641,06s1*

26,320.85

29.5-5=24.5% =

6,448.61

1993 Unit 8

393,750*

6,31534

29.5-5=24.5% =

1,547.26

1992 Unit 7

443,750*

7,262.69

29.5-5=24.5% =

1,779.36

1992 Unit 8

393,750*

6,444.38

29.5-5=24.5% =

1.578.87
$70,182.79

TOTAL'

Taxable value for 1992 and 1993 vac 951 of aarkst ralua.

S 59-2-103

Beginning January 1, 1992, and erery yaar thereafter tha fair aarkat Talaa of
r a a l d a n t i a l pxoparty shall ba raducad by 29.SOI, representing a raaldantial
exesjptioo allowed under Article XIII, Sac. 2, Utah Constitution.
Beginning January 1, 1994, and arary yaar thereaftsr tha fair aarkat Talaa of
r a a i d a n t i a l pxoparty shall ba radacad by 321, representing a r a s i d a n t i a l
exessptioij allowed andar Xrtlola XIXX, f e e . 2, Otah Constitution.
• • g i n n i n g Juno 1, 1993, tha f a i r markst Talua of rasidantial property s h a l l
ba raducad by 431, representing a rasidantial exemption allowed under Xrtlola
XIII, Sac. 2, Utah Constitution.
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LAW OFFICES

MA2I8DXN, CAHOON, OOTTFRXD80N £ BELL, LJL.C,
*fios.«uisoc*.j«.
mcHAftoccAMOOM,*c
j . MHTHAP. oarnmcoscM

FIFTH FLOOR
6 6 SOUTH MAIN
gAI

^T

I | A j n |

C

U T A H

auMWKa
a 4 1 0 1

wotw i r. o*ro* »«c
(80I) 321-3800
FAX (SOU 537-13/3

April 24, 1997

Summit County Commission
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017
Re: Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8
Dear Commission Members:
I represent AJE. Inc., a Utah corporation, which has paid taxes under protest since
1992 for failure of the Summit County Assessor to grant the residential 45% reduction
exemption allowed by Article XDI, Section 2, Utah Constitution, and implemented by the
Utah Legislature as § 59-2-103.
A copy of the 1997 Assessor's letter granting the exemption is enclosed.
I am enclosing copies of the 1992 -1996 property tax notices. All payments were
made in full under protest by certified mail, return receipt requested. I am also enclosing
the worksheet of the tax difference, $70,18179.
It is respectfully requested that you grant the refund because the properties should
have received the primary residential reduction, but due to the Assessor's error in
classification, it was not granted Therefore, it should be refunded at this time.
If you have any questions, please give me a call.
Very truly yours,

Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
MSM/gz
Enclosures
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

A.E., INC.,
Petitioner,

)
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION
) TO DISMISS

v.

) Appeal No. 99-0257

BOARD OF EQUALIZATION,
SUMMIT COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
)

Respondent.

) Judge: Phan
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On July 20,1999, Respondent filed in this matter a Motion to Dismiss on the basis
that Petitioner failed to timely file its appeal before the State Tax Commission. Petitioner had
submitted a Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction on July 9, 1999, and submitted a Response to
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss and in Further Support of Plaintiffs Memorandum Regarding
Jurisdiction on August 9, 1999.
Petitioner owns real property in Summit County and for the years 1992 through 1996
Petitioner was denied the primary residential exemption for such property. For each of these years
Petitioner paid the tax with a letter stating that the payment was made under protest as Petitioner was
entitled to the exemption. Petitioner did not file an affidavit, nor provide any evidence that it
qualified for the residential property tax exemption. In addition. Petitioner apparently did not file
an appeal of the exemption status with the Summit County Board of Equalization for the years in
question. For the 1997 tax year Petitioner filed the appropriate application and affidavit and was
granted the primary residential exemption. Petitioner then filed a refund request with the County for

Appeal No. 99-0257
the 1992 through 1996 tax years. According to Respondent's attorney the Summit County Board of
Commissioners, acting as the Board of Equalization, denied the request on August 14, 1997. This
denial was communicated to Petitioner by letter from Barbara Kresser, Summit County Assessor.
Petitioner did not file an appeal of the decision to the State Tax Commission until July 1998.
Petitioner argues that this is not an appeal from an adverse exemption ruling with the
30 day limitation period allowed under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1102(7). Instead Petitioner indicates
that this is an action for refund of taxes unlawfully and erroneously assessed which it paid under
protest annually and Petitioner asserts that it is entitled to bring this action before the State Tax
Commission under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1328l or §59-2-1321.
The Tax Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal in either instance.2
Petitioner did not comply with the administrative remedies of timely filing an appeal with the County
Board of Equalization annually within thirty days from the date of the property tax notices and then
timely filing an appeal annually with the State Tax Commission pursuant to the Utah Code Ann.

This provision does not support Petitioner's claim as it
merely details how payment is to be made if a refund is ordered.
It is presumably read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. §59-21327 which indicates the procedure for obtaining an order of
refund.
2

See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com;n, 870 P.2d 291, 293
(Utah App. 1994) . In Blaine Hudson the court stated, "A taxpayer
faced with an allegedly erroneous assessment ordinarily has two
statutory methods of challenging the ensuing tax. First, Utah
Code Ann. §§59-2-1004, -1005 (1992) provide that the taxpayer can
file an administrative appeal with the County Board of
Equalization. Second, Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301(1992) authorizes
the taxpayer to pay under protest and seek to recover the tax
paid in an action brought in district court."
-2-

Appeal No. 99-0257
§59-2-1006. Petitioner's appeal to the State Tax Commission nearly one year later is untimely.
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1327 provides that a taxpayer who claims the tax is unlawful
can pay the taxes under protest, as Petitioner did for the years at issue, and then file an action in
district court. A similar remedy is provided in Utah Code Ann. §59-l-3Dl, which again specifically
states that the action is to be filed in district court.
Petitioner also argues that the Tax Commission has jurisdiction to hear the appeal
under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1321. Petitioner is incorrect. This section provides that the county
legislative body can order a refund for property that "has been either erroneously or illegally
assessed." The statute, however, does not provide for an appeal of the county's decision to the State
Tax Commission. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the Tax Commission does not have
jurisdiction to review the County's decision on a §59-2-1321 claim and has suggested that the
appropriate body to review the County's decision was the district court.3
ORDER
Based upon the Commission's review of the motion and consideration of the parties'
positions, the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
DATED this

^&

day of
of J ^J ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ Vf ^
day

1999.

Jaie Phan 1/
Administrative Law Judge

3

See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n, 870 P.2d 291,294
(1994) .

-3-
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION.
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision.
DATED this

tf

day of Qv/£&*i6-&f

J

1999.

TcLm Jum(L^~*-A<^L__
Richard B. McK| own
chairman

/ ^ *

c o

Pam Hendrickson
Commissioner

% , : \

AESSW.

UUA.
R. Bruce Johnson
Commissioner

JU

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner

Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for
Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq.

JKP/99-0257.dis

-4-

C E R T I F I C A T E

Utah State

OF

M A I L I N G

Tax Commission
Appeal

| A. E., Inc.

vs.

99-0257

Summit County BOE

|
'

Ji

A.E., Inc.,

Petitioner
c/o Milo Marsden
_
68 South Main Street, 5th floor
Salt Lake City
UT 84101
Frazier, Blake
Respondent
Summit County Auditor
P 0 Box 128
Coalville
UT 84017
Thomas, David
Attorney for
Respondent
Summit County Deputy Attorney
60 N. Main
P 0 Box 128
Coalville
UT 84017

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document
addressed to each of the above named parties.

Date77

ZL

Y^

0008
EXHIBIT E

MELO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800
FAX NO.: (801) 537-1315

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

A. E., INC.,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

)

vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 99-0257
(Judge Jane Phan)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-466-13, Petitioner alleges the following
points of law and fact which the Commission has overlooked or misapprehended:
1. Petitioner did provide evidence that it qualified for the residential property tax
exemption for the years 1992 through 1996. Petitioner has qualified for the residential
property tax since 1992. Petitioner paid the 1992-1996 taxes with a letter stating that
payment was made under protest and that petitioner qualified for the exemption.
Respondent did not request nor have an affidavit requirement until 1997. Petitioner
never received from respondent a denial of the refund request.
2. Petitioner urges the Commission to focus on Section 59-2-1328, which gives the
Commission jurisdiction in "any action" where a tax paid under protest was unlawfully

collected. Thus, even if the Commission cannot order a refund, the Commission "sua
sponte" can adjust County assessments. Yes, we could file in the district court; however,
the Commission has jurisdiction sua sponte to adjust assessments of the counties. See
Section 59-1-210.
3. Lastly, a review of the Utah Constitution, Section 13, Section 2, and Utah
Code Sections 52-2-103 and 59-2-1100, etc. reveals that the residential exemption is in the
Utah Constitution and in Section 59-1-103. On the other hand, the exemptions under
Section 59-2-1100 etc., which provide for affidavit and exemptions, does not include the
residential exemption. The residential exemption is self-contained and uses language
referring to "this part." In short, the affidavit provision is not part of the residential
exemption.
DATED this

\<fti day of October, 1999.

Milo S. Madden, Jr. I 1
MARSDE^AHOON^
& BEIl^tXc
Attorneys for Plaintiff

2

000G

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION to Robert W. Atkins, Summit County Attorney, and David L
Thomas, Deputy Summit County attorney, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128,
Coalville, Utah 84017, this _/£_Sday of October, 1999, postage prepaid.

Ax/

3

tf/syj^

\ X / 2 0 % Post Consumer Waste
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
A.E., INC.,
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION
Petitioner,
Appeal No.

99-0257

Tax Type:

Property Tax/Locally Assessed

Judge:

Phan

v.
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
SUMMIT COUNTY,
UTAH,
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission upon a Petition for
Reconsideration, dated October 21, 1999, filed by Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final
order dated October 6, 1999.
APPLICABLE LAW
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-29 provides that a Petition for Reconsideration
"will allege as grounds for reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery of new
evidence." Under this rule, the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying
a Petition for Reconsideration.
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon review of the arguments set out in Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration,
although Petitioner disagrees with the Commission's final decision, Petitioner did not provided
information that would indicate a mistake in law or fact sufficient for the Commission to reconsider

RECEIVED

0003

Appeal No.

99-0257

its final order.
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order of the Utah State Tax
Commission that the Petition for Reconsideration is denied. It is so ordered.
DATED this

2i

day of / V &^*^*^/*~*^S

. 1999.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

OUw\

.a

Pam Hendrickson
Commissioner

CuJlo*->
R. Bruce Johnson
Commission^

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this
order pursuant toUtah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46M3 et. seq.
JKP/99-0257 rec

-2-
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0 F

C E R T I F I C A T E
Utah S t a t e Tax
Appeal

A. E . ,

M A I L I N G

Commission

Inc.

VS.

99-0257

Summit County BOE

A.E., Inc.,

Petitioner
c/o Milo Marsden
68 South Main Street, 5th floor
Salt Lake City
UT 84101
Frazier, Blake
Respondent

Summit County Auditor
P 0 Box 128
Coalville
UT 84017
Thomas, David
Attorney for

Respondent

Summit County Deputy Attorney
60 N. Main
P 0 Box 128
Coalville
UT 84017

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document
addressed to each of the above named parties.
/

Date
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CaseNo.990600463PR

A.E. INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

Supreme Court No 20000502 SC

SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION,
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT
COUNTYASSESSOR; and SUMMIT
COUNTY TREASURER,
Defendants.

APRIL 17,2000 HEARING ON MOTION
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
652 Jefferson Cove
Sandy, Utah 84070
801-567-1157

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

MILO S. MARSDEN
MARSDEN, CAHOON,
GOTTFREDSON & BELL
58 South Main, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant:

DAVID L. THOMAS
DAVID G. BAYLES
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
* * *

SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH; APRIL 17 ,2000
HONORABLE JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: This is case 990600463 A. E. Incorporated
vs. Summit County Commission, et al. Will counsel please state
appearances?
MR. BAYLES: Thank you, Your Honor, David Bayles
appearing and arguing for Summit County.
MR, MARSDEN : Milo Marsden for the Plaintiff Taxpayer,
MR. THOMAS: David Thomas for Summit County.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.

It's good to see you

this morning and I appreciate the briefing and the courtesy
copies and I have read the entire file including all memoranda
and exhibits, so I'm well up on it as far as the reading, than
well up, between the cross-motions I got to hear it twice at
least.

It seemed like more than twice actually.

But I think

I'm very familiar with the underlying facts and I'd ask you
appreaeh it any way you'd like. The first question that is in
my mind, probably not the only one by the time we're done; I've
never dealt with this issue of the residential exemption until
I came to Summit County.

Since then I have had it in other

context but I don't know how other counties do it.

Is this

affidavit something that all counties follow exactly the same
form or is that a local approach?

That's something that I'd

like to know but approach it anyway you like.
1

MR. THOMAS: We can certainly address that because
Barbara Kesler is the County Assessor. Mr. Bayles will address
that.
THE COURT: Okay,

Thank you. Go ahead Counsel.

MR. BAYLES: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: I guess they are cross motions, but we'll
start with you and just so no one get hung up about who gets
rebuttal, you can all say all you want.
MR, BAYLES: Thank you. May it please the Court, my
name again is David Bayles.
Summit County.

I'm pleased to be presenting for

Plaintiff paid his real property taxes for the

tax years 1992 through and including 1996 on two units of
property at the Bald Eagle Club, Deer Valley Resort, Summit
County, Utah and with each tax payment, accompanied it by a
letter stating that the tax was paid under protest.

The letter

mentioned a residential property tax exemption.
In 1999, December of that year, Plaintiff filed the
complaint in this eourt alleging that his property had been
taxed unlawfully.

Defendants now bring this motion praying

this Court to rule that there has been no unlawful taxation of
the property; that the statute of limitations bars the
complaint for the tax years 1992 through 1995 and that the
definition of the residential property exemption does not apply
to Plaintiff's unimproved parcels. Summary Judgment is of
course, appropriate in this state where there are no genuine
2

1

issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

2

judgment as a matter of law.

3

parties are in agreement that there are no genuine issues of

4

material fact.

5

Pursuant to the pleadings the

Defendants offer three questions of law that are

6

right for this Court for decision.

7

presence of this strict application requirement.

8

is, the effect of the statute of limitations. And the third

9

is, this definition of residential property tax exemption as

10
11

The first one is, the
The second

applied to the unimproved parcel.
The first question of law, the strict application

12

requirement, is supported by three principles.

13

is the plain language of the statute. The second, the Utah

14

State Tax Commission rules, and the third, general policy

15

considerations of equity.

16

The first one

The first principle, the plain language of the

17

statute. Utah Code 59-2-1102, sub-paragraph 2, says that no

18

exemption shall be granted unless there is an application filed

19

and that that application is verified by oath and sets forth

20

facts upon which the exemption can be granted.

21

been some suggestion that Plaintiff's letter of protest might

22

perhaps qualify as this application.

23

Now, there's

Summit County disagrees. That letter simply stated

24

that a residential property exemption should have been afforded

25

but does not state any factual basis upon which it should have

1

been granted.

It's not signed by the person who was living

2

there at the residence; alleged to have been living there and

3

it's not verified by oath, suggesting that the person who was

4

alleged to have been living there, did not realize the grave

5

import of being truthful with those who would read that

6

application and accordingly, it's Defendant's position that the

7

strict application requirements of Section 59-2-1102 were not

8

complied with.

9

in this case say that where a statute is unambiguous, that it

Long standing rules of statutory construction

10

must be according to the plain language of the statute and that

11

is the reading of 59-1-1102.

12

The second principle that supports this strict

13

application requirement, are the rules of the Utah State Tax

14

Commission.

15

bears the burden of coming forth with that evidence upon which

16

an exemption should be granted and goes on to further state

17

that conclusive evidence must be presented so that the taxing

18

entity ean make an evaluation of the qualifications and

19

determine whether or not an exemption is appropriate. Thus,

20

those rules of the Utah State Tax Commission support this

21

strict application requirement that's in the code.

22

The Tax Commission has said that the taxpayer

THE COURT: In both those areas, I guess, the statute

23

and the rule, I think Mr. Marsden raises an issue of note, as

24

he responded to this constructive notice. How does the

25

taxpayer know about, I mean know it's a statute. There's an

1

issue, I think, of whether this exemption is included within

2

that statute; but even on the Tax Commission Rule, which takes

3

it a step further, that you're relying on also, how does this

4

information get conveyed to the taxpayer?

5

MR. BAYLES: The constructive notices, the presence in

6

the statute.

7

since 1988. In this particular case, where the Plaintiff is

8

represented by a member of the Utah State Bar, that member of

9

the bar should be deemed with the notice to go forth and to

10
11

The statute has been in place without amendment

check the statute.
THE COURT: Is there a different standard if you're

12

represented by a lawyer?

13

on constructive notice?

14

What if he wasn't?

Would he still be

MR. BAYLES: No, well, the constructive notice is

15

within the code and the taxpayer would be duly, or should be

16

deemed, to at least contact the county and to find out what

17

application is required to receive this exemption.

18

THE COURT: Is that what happens?

If a taxpayer does

19

contact the county and say I want this exemption, is there some

20

process in place whereby he or she is then told what to do?

21

MR, BAYLES: Yes, Your Honor, There is an application

22

form that is used by the county and that application is sent

23

out to the taxpayer.

24
25

THE COURT: But sending out that form is not treated
by a protest, a payment under protest?

MR. BAYLES: No Your Honor. The payment under protest
in this particular case, was paid to the Summit County
Treasurer.
THE COURT: That's a different entity/ isn't it? I
mean the assessor does not send them onto the assessor and say,
"Look at that".
MR. BAYLES: That's correct. The treasurer—
THE COURT: I noted that and I wasn't (inaudible),
MR, BAYLES: Thank you.
General policy considerations also support this
strict application requirement.

The taxpayer is in the

exclusive control of the information, the evidence upon which
an exemption may be granted and as such should be required to
come forth with that information and evidence and apply for the
exemption.

Were it otherwise, the Summit County Assessor's

Office would be charged with going forth and ferreting out this
information and evidence upon which any possible exemption
eould be based.

Indeed the benefit that eould be derived from

this real property taxation model, would be consumed by this
exemption investigation team, charged with the responsibility
of seeking out this information.

Indeed, by way of general

policy, government efficiencies and economy of resources,
support this strict application requirement.
Thus, under this first principle of law, Defendants
pray this Court to rule that the strict application
6

1

requirement, not having been met, therefore, requires a finding

2

that there's no unlawful taxation.

3

The second principle of law is the statute of

4

limitations.

5

annotation titled ^Statute of Limitations' and a case cited

6

there; Centennial Eureka Mining Company versus Juab County.

7

that case, a Utah constitutional provision provided for the

8

taxation of mining proceeds and gave an effective date.

9

In the annotation to 59-2-1327, there's an

In

THE COURT; I read that and you laid it out and I

10

think you said in one of your statements, it does not deem to

11

be a significant or any dispute over which statute of

12

limitations applies.

13

argument is, if we were doing the administrative route it would

14

toll statutes.

15

It all comes down to accrual and the

Is there any law on that?

MR. BAYLES: Except for this case, it says that the

16

moment the tax is paid under protest the cause of action

17

accrues and that no other, the case specifically says, that no

18

other requirements need be met.

19

THE COURT: And that's a hundred years ago.

20

MR. BAYLES: That's right. A long standing rule in

21

this state and the Defendant was very careful to shepardize

22

that and finds that is still the law in this state.

23

Accordingly, Plaintiff's taxation, Plaintiff's

24

payment of taxes under protest from 1992 to 1995 should be

25

deemed by this Court to be barred by the statute of

1
2

limitations.
Now, the third principle of law that's a companion to

3

that second argument, is the effect of the definition upon

4

Plaintiff § Unit 8 property whigh was assessed as unimproved.

5

Definition says that the property must be residential to

6

qualify for this exemption and accordingly, the Unit 8 property

7

which was unimproved, should be deemed to have been taxed

8

lawfully. And also as a corollary to that argument, sub-

9

paragraph 3 of 59-2-103 limits the exemption to the first acre

10

of land and Plaintiff's Units 7 and 8's property together,

11

total 1.57 acres of land and accordingly it would be

12

appropriate to rule that the majority of that Unit 8 property

13

under that provision was not taxed unlawfully.

14

Thus, in summary Your Honor, Summit County prays this

15

Court to rule that there's been no unlawful taxation of

16

Plaintiff's property in all years; that the statute of

17

limitations bars recovery for the 1992 through 1995 claims.

18

And that the definition of the exemption bars recovery for the

19

Unit 8, unimproved property, or in the alternative there that

20

sub-paragraph 3, limits it to one acre. Thank you.

21

THE COURT; Thank you, Mr. Bayles.

22

Mr. Marsden?

23

MR. MARSDEN: Thank you, Your Honor, Counsel and

24
25

members of Summit County government, and Your Honor.
Brief factual history, the Plaintiff as stated did
8

1

pay the real property taxes under protest, in writing, for the

2

years 1992 through 1996 and there are two statutes, 59-1-301

3

regarding payment under protest, and 59-2*1327, payment under

4

protest which was cited in each letter.

5

that the property meets the residential requirement as used in

6

the statute and it has been used as a primary residence.

7
8

It's our contention

THE COURT: Do you contend that to be so for more than
the acre, or just the one acre?

9

MR, MARSDEN: Your Honor, I have to concede that the

10

statute does say one acre and in my presentation I exceed to

11

that and take that into account.

12

account.

13

That should be taken into

THE COURT: I think up to the acre, I don't think you

14

really have a dispute then whether it qualifies.

15

very difficult problem equitably I think that it appears to

16

qualify all along, that's really not going to be our stumbling

17

block.

18

timely; whether procedure was followed. So...

19

It's really a

It's whether there can be a refund; whether it's

MR. MARSDEN: That's what I thought, however, I read

20

the pleadings that there may be an issue as to whether the

21

resident was a resident. Now, I don't think there is but I

22

could see—

23
24
25

THE COURT: Maybe you should clarify that before you
concede anything.
Mr. Bayles, is there a question whether it was?

1
2

MR. BAYLES: Your Honor, there is nothing before this
Court from Mr. Anderson stating that he was a resident.

3

THE COURT: So at this point, you still lack an

4

affidavit for those.

Is the affidavit an every year

5

requirement on this exemption?

6

MR. BAYLES: No, it's not.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

8
9
10
11

On some exemptions it is; is that

correct?
MR, BAYLES: That's correct, Your Honor,
THE COURT: But you say the affidavit doesn't cover
those years. Obviously that could be corrected.

12

MR. BAYLES: That's right.

13

MR. MARSDEN: So the result was that the Plaintiff

14

paid his property taxes based on one hundred percent of fair

15

market value as opposed to fifty-five percent and as originally

16

calculated, the difference was about $70,000; but if we take

17

into account the one-acre limitation and I admit that there was

18

a factual error in the addition that would bring it down by my

19

figures to $55,576.66.

20

Now, payment under protest says, where a tax is

21

demanded and the person whose property is taxed, claims the tax

22

is unlawful, that person may pay the tax under protest to the

23

county treasurer.

24

district court against the officer or taxing entity to recover

25

the tax or any portion of the tax paid under protest. Now,

The person may then bring an action in the

10

1

it's our contention that Brad Allen Anderson resided on the

2

property during the years in question, 1992 through 1996

3

continuously and that it was his primary residence and that the

4

Plaintiff is entitled to the taxes based upon the fifty-five

5

percent fair market value•

6

Now, a taxpayer has two ways to go, as I've learned.

7

He can go by way of administrative appeal, or he can go by

8

district court action.

9

those two avenues are open and in the case Blaine Hudson, which

It's not an election of remedies, but

10

is 870 Pacific second 291, a 1994 Supreme Court decision, the

11

court says "A taxpayer faced with an allegedly erroneous

12

assessment ordinarily has two statutory methods of challenging

13

the ensuing tax.

14

and 105 provide the taxpayer can file an administrative appeal

15

with the County Board of Equalization."

16

First, Utah Code annotated Sections 59-2-104

Second, Utah Code annotated Section 59-1-301 and it

17

would include 59-2-1327, "authorizes the taxpayer to pay under

18

protest and seek to recover the tax paid in an action brought

19

in district court."

20

The court also says this, which I think is pertinent

21

and very interesting and it's a quote, "In either case, the

22

county is on notice that the assessment and the tax are being

23

challenged and in both cases the taxpayer has an explicit right

24

to appeal an unfavorable decision".

25

What did the taxpayer do here?

The taxpayer did
11

1

proceed under an administrative appeal and the admitted facts,

2

the claim filed with the treasurer paying the taxes in full for

3

years 1992 through 1996. There were appeals to the Board of

4

Equalization for the value and the classification adjustments,

5

and there was some relief given on values and I think it's

6

probably unnecessary to go into those; but there was this

7

constant contact on classification and value issues.

8

THE COURT: Starting as early as what year?

9

MR, MARSDEN: Well, I know that with regards to

10

classification facts, there was a letter sent August 22, 1995

11

seeking an appointment and on September 5, 1995, a call to

12

Steve Martin who was in the Assessor's Office charged with this

13

area and the assessment issues.

14

1996 a review of the market value and it said and/or

15

classification and the classification change will be reflected

16

on the tax notice. Now, the tax notice, when it did come did

17

not reflect the change.

18

protest.

19

hearing or application or affidavit on a primary residential

20

classification.

21

told about that and we did file it immediately and the primary

22

residential classification was granted for the year 1997.

23

I received on September 12,

Taxes were paid in 1995 again under

There was no notice to the taxpayer regarding a

This didn't happen until 1997 when we were

We then requested a refund for the prior years, that

24

was in March of 1997. The affidavit was dated February 3, 1997

25

and as I said, the assessor changed it to the primary
12

1

residential on April 17, 1997. What I was frankly pursuing was

2

have I exhausted my administrative remedy and continued to

3

pursue that with a lot of contact from-

4

THE COURT: Did you believe, Mr. Marsden, that you had

5

to exhaust it before you could go the district court route?

6

You've laid it out that you have two options under the statute.

7

MR. MARSDEN: Yeah, to be honest, I thought that I

8

did.

Today, I don't think I did.

The assessor sent me a

9

resolution passed by the county in June, 1992 where the county

10

said that there are equitable considerations that require tax

11

refunds to taxpayers who qualified for the primary residential

12

classification but who paid the full rate. The treasurer

13

authorized to make the refunds on the difference between the

14

taxes paid at the one hundred percent rate and the lower rate.

15

I'm not made aware of this until 1997, however, and I talked

16

with Dave Thomas and said I need a final determination from the

17

commission.

18

Sent a certified letter to the assessor to get a final

19

determination.

20

Dave Thomas in March 20, 1998. No official decision from the

21

Commission,

22

Nothing happened.

23

route to the Tax Commission on July 16, 1998. We went through

24

that and it was dismissed on December 8, 1999 with the Tax

25

Commission referring to the payment under protest statute 59-2-

I called the county clerk for an agenda time.

Requested a hearing.

Sent a letter again to

I requested a meeting with the commission.
I did finally appeal the administrative

13

1327.

So within about two or three weeks I filed this action.
Now, I think the pertinent issues revolve around the

statute of limitations. Does it start when you pay the tax?
And I believe that hundred year old case still stands for that
proposition; but the issue then becomes, does it get tolled?
And the ease Baker versus Tax Commission which is 520 Pacific
second, 203, a 1974 case says "we hold that the commission does
have the power to remove from the assessment roles property
which it finds to be constitutionally or statutorily exempt
from taxation and that it is not necessary for a taxpayer to
pay under protest and to be put to the expense of a lawsuit
until he has exhausted his administrative remedies." Well,
I've outlined what steps were taken and how we did go that
route.
Now, I think it's informative to look at tolling
statute 78-12-40 which Judge Billings has an opinion, I'll give
you the citation, she refers to that as the xsavings statute'.
And it says, "if any action is commenced within due time, and
Plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action,
otherwise and upon the merits and the time limited either by
law or by contract for commencing the same, shall have expired,
the Plaintiff may commence a new action within one year after
the failure".
So what are the open years?

If we look at the

administrative actions as beginning a tolling effect, they'd
14

is entitled CP versus Utah Office of Crime Victims Reparations.
It's 966 Pacific second 12-26, it's a 1998 Utah appellate case.
It did go to the Supreme Court on certiorari and was denied.
Fgr me it stands for the proposition that an administrative
procedure can be tolled by the savings statute THE COURT: But does that mean that an administrative
procedure will be treated as an initial filing which when
dismissed or concluded other than on the merit was saved, the
saving statute one year period to file again?
MR. MARSDEN: I believe so.
THE COURT: It doesn't sound like it's quite the same
thing.
And the other question that I have, you've been
through a full process just for appeal. Is that other than on
the merits?
MR- MARSDEN; Yes, because it says we don't get to
that issue. You're to look to the district court under your
13-27 Section• But even if weren't, from the beginning of the
Administrative Appeal, certainly when the appeal, the formal
appeal is filed with the Tax Commission in July of 1998, the
year 1994, 5, 6, would be open on that theory.

So again, if

it's the administrative action that qualifies for the tolling
of the savings statute, all years are open.

If it's filing the

appeal, taking that kind of an action, in 1998, the years 1994,
5, and 6 would be open. And if none of them apply, at least
15

§, and 6 would be open. And if none of them apply, at least
1995, let's see, filed in '99, '95, certainly '96 would be
open.
I've given you the citation of Judge Billings and I
don't think I need to read from it.

I'd be happy to entertain

any THE COURT: But the facts in the CP Case were that a
savings statute applied to an administrative action dismissed
not on the merit but for refiling of another administrative
action in that case?
MR. MARSDEN: It was sent back to the administrative
agency for action.

Frankly, Your Honor I don't remember the

specifics of THE COURT: Tell me about that Baker case with the Tax
Commission again. Do you have that there?

Baker, 520 Pacific

second?
MR. MARSDEN: I do.
THE COURT: Yes, I'm not sure I understood the facts
and holding in that.
MR. MARSDEN: Well, I'm not sure that I needed it or
said it clearly. What it said to me was that it's - I don't
want to get caught up and it hasn't been THE COURT: You said they didn't have to pay a tax
under protest or be required to go to the court, forced to?
MR. MARSDEN: Yeah.

Just let me...
16

1
2

THE COURT: Take the time you need. We don't have
anyone waiting for us,

3

MR. MARSDEN: We hold that the Commission does have

4

the power to do certain things that don't apply to this and

5

that it is not necessary for a taxpayer to pay under protest

6

and be put to the expense of a lawsuit until he has exhausted

7

his administrative remedies. What I have trouble with, is,

8

what should I have done?

9

two opportunities and what that shows to me is that I didn't

I've learned, hindsight is great, the

10

have to even pay under protest.

11

administrative route; but it was paid under protest so maybe

12

that...

13

I could have gone the

THE COURT: But once you pay under protest, does that
I mean do you have an option to

14

put you in the lawsuit tract?

15

go back administratively?

16

sent back to the district court and that's the ruling of the

17

Tax Commission.

18

under protest you really do have the choice?

19

You did it.

It finished up being

Do you find any law that says once you've paid

MR. MARSDEN: Well, I do. That's the way I read that

20

Blaine Hudson Case, "A taxpayer faced with an allegedly

21

erroneous assessment ordinarily has two statutory methods".

22

THE COURT: Again, that's what I'm thinking about.

23

One is to go the Board of Equalization or address it that way;

24

the other is to pay under protest and sue in the district

25

court.
17

MR. MARSDEN: Correct. And they go on to say "in
either case# the County is on notice that the assessment and
the tax are being challenged. And in both cases the taxpayer
has an explicit right tQ appeal an unfavorable decision". What
I have problem with is in dealing with the county, not being
told about what they tell me is constructive notice that I
should have gotten my taxpayer owner to file an affidavit and
that this was an application procedure.
THE COURT; I guess what we hear there is two
different entities within the County, sub-entities, involved,
the treasurer and the assessor and the treasurer doesn't have
either the knowledge or the responsibility to tell you and
there was no communication with the assessor so they weren't on
notice that you were even making the protest, that would
therefore not trigger or generate the notice you're seeking.
Is that what you're hearing too?
MR. MARSDEN: I don't know about any communication
between the treasurer and the assessor but eertainly I had
contact with both. And the point that I struggled with and I
think I find the answer in this Blaine Hudson case, in either
case/ whether paying under protest or going the administrative
route, the Supreme Court says the County is on notice that the
assessment and the tax are being challenged.
THE COURT: What were the contacts with the assessor
from 1992 through 1996?
18

1

MR. MARSDEN: Following the notice to the Board of

2

Equalization; being put in touch with Steve Martin in the

3

Assessor's office -

4

THE COURT: When did this occur?

5

MR. MARSDEN: There may be earlier dates but I can

6

tell the Court that certainly by August 22, 1995 I have a

7

document and then I certified letters to the assessor about the

8

classification and the market value issues and parenthetically

9

we went to the Tax Commission on the market value issue. We

10

resolved it, settled it by stipulation but we didn't settle the

11

classification issue.

12
13

THE COURT: Have you raised the residential
classification issue in 1995?

14

MR. MARSDEN: Yes.

15

THE COURT: In that letter?

16

MR. MARSDEN: Y©s?

17

THE COURT: Was that one of your exhibits?

18

Did I

miss that?

19

MR. MARSDEN: It's not.

20

THE COURT: Do you have it there?

21

MR, MARSDEN: I don't honestly remember. I have a copy

22

of the certified mail.

23

THE COURT: But not the letter itself?

24

MR. MARSDEN: Yes.

25

It's the letter with the certified

mail.
19

THE COURT: Does it refer to a classification
residential classification or not?
MR. MARSDEN: Let's see. *I am in receipt of your
notice of property valuation and tax change for 1995 on the
captioned properties.
hearing appointment.

I called your office to arrange for a
I was told that Steve Martin is handling

these valuations and would call me.
I also note that the deadline for application to the
Board of Equalization is September 8, 1995, This letter is to
serve as application to the Board of Equalization for an appeal
on the market value of the captioned properties."
THE COURT: So that one was directed to market value.
You may have the other thing in mind but it wasn't set forth.
Any other matters, Mr. Marsden?
MR. MARSDEN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Response Mr. Bayles?
MR. BAYLES: Thank you, Your Honor.

The presumption

is that property is assessed at one hundred pereent of market
value unless this application is made and it's disingenuous to
assert that because the payment of tax under protest was made,
that accordingly an exemption could have been qualified for
that therefore, it was also unlawfully taxes. The unlawfulness
which is the claim of the Plaintiff here does not arise until
the exemption arises to the property and the exemption is
created by the Constitution.

It's created by the exemption and
20

it's created by application for the exemption. Once that
application is made and if the exemption was then denied, then
Plaintiff might appropriately be able to say that their
property has been unlawfully taxed.
Now on this question of the statute of limitations.
This is the first that Summit County is hearing about this
Baker Case today but it sounded like what it provided for was
two parallel ways to attack this problem, the payment under tax
protest way and the administrative remedies way.

But the

presence of two actions does not necessary mean that the
ability to exhaust remedies tolls the complaint in the district
court.

In fact/ the complaint in the district court, because

of the greater expense that it puts the Plaintiff to, could be
said to be a failsafe after exhausting administrative remedies
in the negative.
Now, as to the statute that was mentioned, the toll
saving statute.

It says that, well, Summit County isn't sure

that it even applies in this case beeause of it speaks of
actions being dismissed on the merits and it was an
administrative action that Plaintiff brought and had dismissed
rather than an action in the district court.
One other thing by way of equities of this case, Your
Honor, these monies have been long since collected in a general
fund of Summit County and long since expended for the benefit
of the residents of Summit County to allow the Plaintiff to
21

come back now under a deficient or non-existent application and
then recover for those exemptions that should have been applied
for in the past, is to put a serious strain on the coffers of
the government inappropriately as mentioned, particularly in
this case, because of the constructive notice at the very least
that the Plaintiff was under. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bayles.
Anything further, Mr. Marsen?
MR. MARSDEN:

Yes, Your Honor. I'm sensitive to the

paying cash and I proposed that if that's a problem, just give
credit for years to come. I don't know if that's an
appropriate item for this forum.
THE COURT: That goes with the argument that it's a
strain on the coffers.
MR. MARSDEN: Let me go into now the necessity of
affidavit and application.

I can of hoped to avoid that

because I had finally concluded in my mind, that if you go back
through the district court you don't get caught up in all that
affidavit, application bit, it's just that's the administrative
procedure.

The issue for the district court is does the

taxpayer qualify for the exemption?

Was it used as primary

residential property for the years being raised?

But there are

some interesting issues on the affidavit, application. The
Code in the revenue and taxation sections, under what's called
the property tax act, the general provisions, provide for this
22

residential exemption and it says the rate of assessment of
residential property is the heading and today and back, I
don't know when it began but "fair market of residential

property shall be reduced by forty-five percent representing a
residential exemption allowed under the Utah Constitution".
And it does say in that section as we've said, no more than one
acre.

That's that first section.
Now the next item we come to is - well, let me say,

let me make a point. No place does it say there about an
affidavit or an application requirement. Now under 59-2-1101
which is entitled ^exemptions'. It says "the exemptions
authorized by this part" and the part is 11, if you look at
that closely, "maybe allowed only if the claimant owns the
property January 1st" and then some language about if it's an
estate. And then it says, "the following property is exempt

from taxation; property exempt under U. s. law$, property of
states, counties, and other governmental entities, non profits,
burial, farm equipment, intangible". Residential Property is
not listed. Maybe it's just an oversight.

I don't know but

it's not there. But it goes on "the owner who receives the
exempt status of those items" not mentioning residential, "if
required by the Commission shall file an affidavit". And then
it lists certain things that the affidavit is to contain for
those items and then it says "if the affidavit isn't filed
within the time limits prescribed by the County Board of
23

1

Equalization, the exempt status may, after notice and hearing, j

2

be revoked and the property placed on the tax rolls''. And then

3

it says "the County legislative body may adopt rules to

4

effectuate the exemptions provided in this p&rt".

5

to belabor this but this part, from my reading, doesn't cover

6

the residential and then it goes on 11-02, "County Board of

7

Equalization may, after giving notice in a manner prescribed by

8

rule, determine whether certain property is exempt from

9

taxation, The decision to be writing" and so forth.

I don't want

10

Well, the point I'm trying to make and I'm being a

11

little redundant, I've concluded - and I do have a question,

12

but I've concluded that you go to the district court - that you

13

bypass all of that stuff and the issue is did your taxpayer

14

qualify?

15

I'm saying is if I'm wrong and you bring all that

16

administrative procedure into it, is it a constitutional

17

provision that gives you that and the exemption items don't

18

seem to eover the residential and therefore, they're now

19

telling us in 1997 that we needed it back to 1992 for the first

20

time, may not come into play.

21

Thank you.

22

THE COURT: Mr. Bayles, what is the impact, if any,

Was he using that as his primary residence?

But what

23

that this particular exemption, which is not a complete

24

exemption like most of those in 11-02, but what's the response

25

if not there, so where does the requirement for affidavit come
24

from?
MR. BAYLES: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I missed that.
THE COURT: Are you relying on 11-02 to give the
affidavit requirement?
MR. BAYLES: We are.
THE COURT: But it does not refer to residential
exemption.
MR. BAYLES: It doesn't.
THE COURT: Isn't there also a rule there that
requires the affidavit?
MR. BAYLES: It's in the Utah State Tax Commission.
THE COURT: Does that refer to the residential?
MR. BAYLES: It does.
THE COURT: And so that's more specific?
MR. BAYLES: It is.
THE COURT: Sg you're not hanging entirely on 11-02?
MR. BAYLES: That's correct.
THE COURT: So what about the argument though that
it's not there in 11-02, is that affect your constructive
notice argument?
MR, BAYLES: It doesn't because it goes to the
constitutional provision by which the exemption is created.

In

Utah Constitution Article 13, Section 2, sub-section 8, it says
that the Legislature xmay' provide for a residential property
tax exemption. Now, implicit in the power to create the
25

exemption is the power to control how it arises and the
legislature used Section 59-2-1102 to control how this
exemption arose. Now it may not have actually said residential
property tax exemption, but that would not be the first time
that the Legislature used numerous sections of the code
throughout the code to control a particular subject and that
would be Summit County's contention on that particular point.
Does that answer your question?
THE COURT; Yes, it does.
MR. BAYLES: The policy behind this application
requirement is to give Summit County those facts upon which to
base the exemption and those are the express provisions of
11-02.

Were that section not available to us, there is not

other way for us to receive those facts and the State taxing
system is based on this general presumption of taxation and the
exemption to be applied for.

Thank you.

THE COURT: As I said, you both have briefed it
thoroughly and have argued the case thoroughly and I'm
presented with cross motions for summary judgment.

I certainly

find there are no material factual disputes that would bar
summary judgment in this case.

I confess that there is an

underlying unease about it - and not to criticize any party - I
think may be that unease is simply that I feel like I'm
compelled to a certain result and yet I see a very competent
lawyer in Mr. Marsden having struggled with this for years and
26

followed some paths that seem reasonable that seem to have come
to no fruition for him and there' s something in that result
that troubles me.

Nevertheless/ I feel like we have to go back first to
what this Court can even examine. Mr. Marden raises the
question of whether the Court examines the procedures, the
filing of the affidavit, whether that was appropriate, or
whether the Court should determine whether in fact the property
was entitled to the exemption,

I don't think that's the case.

The Court is not the taxing entity.
entity.

The County is the taxing

It does the assessment and makes the determination,

which determination can then be reviewed by the District Court
after paying of a tax under protest; but that's what the Court
reviews, whether that was an appropriate decision.

The Court

shouldn't be the one making the decision. We would be assuming
a role that is not our role.
For the Court to have any role, it has to done within
an appropriate time. At first I find that indeed for the years
1992 through 1996, the Plaintiff did not comply with the
affidavit requirements and therefore did not overcome the
presumption of taxing at one hundred percent of value, even if
it had done that, of course, it would be reduction to the one
acre, but I don't think we reached that question in this case.
The statute of limitations raises some difficult
issues because Mr. Marsden proceeded, I think, in good faith
27

and quite logically but I think he got caught by the two
options that were available.

I find that although it is

certainly an option under the Blaine Hudson case, and the way
the law is set forth to proceed along the adminigtrative path,
that does not toll the statute of limitations and once a tax is
paid under protest, that it is possible, I'm not making a
finding, that he had to go to district court suit route, but if
he wanted to keep that option, he had to do within four years.
So I don't entirely agree with the Tax Commission that that was
his only choice but that if he was to sue, that he had to do
within four years of payment under protest and suit certainly
was not filed within those four years.
The savings statute does not apply.

The savings

statute applies to cases filed in the district court that were
dismissed other than on their merits. A case has to be
commenced. A cage is commenced by filing gf a complaint and
then, of course, the next step is service of a summons, usually
within 120 days but for example, failure to serve that summons
might result in a dismissal, not on the merits and then that
case can be renewed within one year if the statute has
otherwise run.
In any event, and I confess somewhat reluctantly, but
I think appropriately, I find that the motion for summary
judgment is well taken on the basis of, one, failure to file
the affidavit in 1992 through 1996 and two, on statute of
28

1

limitations,

2

Will you prepare an order, Mr. Bayles?

3

MR. BAYLES: Yes

4

THE COURT: Thank you.

5

MR. MARSDEN: Your Honor, may I just raise the issue,

6

isn't the statute of limitations at least open for that year

7 J 1996?

It's a four-year statute of limitations.
THE COURT: Let's see.

9 I

MR. MARSDEN:

1996 you paid on what date?

The payment in 1996?

10

THE COURT: It probably was late 1996, correct?

11

MR. MARSDEN: Correct,

12

THE COURT: And then you, in 1997, by March you did

13

the application in February, filed it in March, had your

14

decision in April.

15

limitations for 1996 but I've also found that you failed to

16

make the appropriate application so I agree it should be

17

modified to say statute of limitations only back 1992 through

18

1995.

I think you're right on the statute of

I think that's a eorreet clarification. Okay?

19

Thank you, Mr. Bayles, Mr. Marsden,

20 J

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)

21
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - COALVILLE COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MINUTES
CROSS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

A.E. INC.,
Plaintiff,

Case No: 990600463 PR

vs .
SUMMIT COUNTY TREASURER
Defendant.

Clerk:

Et al,

Judge:
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Plaintiff's Attorney(s): MILO S MARSDEN
Defendant's Attorney{s): DAVID L. THOMAS
DAVID G. BAYLES
Video
Tape Count: 1,33-2,27:54

HEARING
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE PRESENTED, ARGUED AND
SUBMITTED.
COURT FINDS THAT THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS THAT COURT CAN
EXAMINE AS TO WHETHER THE COUNTY IS THE ENTITY TO MAKE THE
DECISION.
FIRST, DURING THE YEARS 1992-1996 PLAINTIFF DID NOT COMPLY WITH
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION RULES WHO REQUIRES THAT AN AFFIDAVIT
MUST BE FILED WHEN SOMEONE PAYS THEIR TAXES UNDER PROTEST.
SECOND, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN FOR THE YEARS
1992-1995. COURT INSTRUCTS THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS AN OPTION, ONCE THE
TAX IS PAID UNDER PROTEST AN ACTION HAS TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN 4
YEARS.
COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT SAVING THE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY.
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION REQUIRES THAT AN AFFIDAVIT BE FILED
AND NONE WAS FILED. THE LETTER OF PROTEST IS NOT AN APPLICATION;
IT IS NOT VERIFIED BY OATH.
THEREFOR, COURT GRANTS DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FIRST ON NO AFFIDAVIT AND SECOND ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
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MR BAYLES TO PREPARE AN APPROPRIATE ORDER CONSISTANT WITH COURT'S
RULING ON THE RECORD.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

A.E., INC. a Utah Corporation,
PLAINTIFF,

VS.
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION;
et. al.,

ORDER ON THE PARTIES
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. 990600463PR
Judge Robert K. Hilder

DEFENDANTS.

The parties motions for summary judgment came on for hearing on April 17, 2000. The
Court has reviewed the motions and memoranda in support and opposition, and has heard the oral
argument of counsel. There exists no genuine issues of material fact, to wit:
1.

Plaintiff owns the two units of real property in Summit County which are the subject of
the complaint.

2.

For the tax years 1992 through 1996 the two units of property were taxed at market value
without reduction for any exemption.

3.

Plaintiff filed a letter with the Summit County Treasurer in each tax year asserting
payment of property taxes under protest and that the property was not given the benefit of
a residential property tax exemption.

4.

Plaintiff never filed an application or affidavit for a residential property tax exemption
with Summit County, pursuant to U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) and the Utah State Tax
Commission Standards of Practice.

5.

Plaintiff paid his 1995 property taxes on November 30, 1995 and paid his property taxes
for the years 1992 through 1994 before the end of each year they were due.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate and for the defendants for the following reasons:
1.

It is not the province of the Court to determine whether or not, in fact, the exemption
applies to the plaintiff; for the Court is not the taxing entity, rather Summit County is the
taxing entity and it does the assessment and makes the determination. Summit County's
determination can then be reviewed by the Court after payment of the tax under protest.
That's what the Court reviews-whether Summit County made the appropriate decision.
The Court should abstain from being the initial decision maker, such actions being outside
the role of the judicial branch.
2

U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), as amended, and the Utah State Tax Commission Standards of
Practice require an application filed, under oath, setting forth facts upon which a
residential property tax exemption may be granted. That application was not filed in this
case for the tax years in question.
The presumption favoring the full market value taxation of real property was not overcome
in the instant case in the absence of the above-referenced application filing.
A cause of action accrued to the plaintiff at the moment he paid his tax under protest, and
in each year they were paid under protest, and the applicable statute of limitations is four
years from the date of a tax payment under protest. Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v.
Juab County. 62 P. 1024, (Utah 1900), U.C.A. §78-12-25.
Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n. 870 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1994), recognizes
a taxpayer's option to file in District Court and seek recovery of taxes paid or to pursue
administrative appeals with the County Board of Equalization; but, neither that case, nor
any other case or provision of the Utah Code operates to toll the statute of limitations when
a taxpayer chooses to pursue administrative remedies. Therefore, though a taxpayer is not
required to pursue a district court remedy, the moment taxes are paid under protest, a
cause of action must be commenced within four years.

3

ORDER
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court now hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND
DECREES:
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to all unlawful taxation claims
for all years, no affidavit having been filed for any of the years; and further, the statute of
limitations bars recovery for the claims from 1992 through and including 1995, the causes of
action accruing more than four years before the filing of the complaint. Accordingly, plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment is denied.

DATED this / / ^davof
— day

U-

A<

,2000.

BY THE COURT:

ROBEfcT K. HILDER".
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Approved as to Form:

Milo S/ Marsden, Jr.
CounseHor Plaintifi
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WORKSHEET OF TAX DIFFERENCE
(For Failure to Give Residential Exemption
Under § 59-2-103, Utah Code Annotated)

1996 Unit 7

$4,216,103 -

<* 4 0 , 8 7 2 0 °
$48£4fc65

1996 Unit 8

644,000 =

7,368.65

x45%

1995 Unit 7

3,488,103 =

44,333.79

x45%

1995 Unit 8

560,000 =

7,117.60

x45%

3,20192 X*%,-/°*, r 7

1994 Unit 7

1,641,068 =

26,844.59

x32%

8,590.27

1994 Unit 8

393,750 =

6,440.96

x32%

2,061.11 j<»/^s 4 W

1993 Unit 7

1,641,06s1* =

26,320.85

29.5-5=24.5% =

6,448.61

1993 Unit 8

393,750* =

6,31534

29.5-5=24.5% =

1,547.26 ;%<j--

1992 Unit 7

443,750* =

7,26169

29.5-5=24.5% =

1,779.36

1992 Unit 8

393,750* =

6,444.38

29.5-5=24.5%=

v1.578.87 % *fa **>**-

TOTAL2

x45%
3,315.89 * % = « 2 ¥c
=

19,950.21

fltf

$7Q,182.ff
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u
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Taxabla valua for 1992 aad 1993 vaa 9SI of aarkat ralua.

S 39-2-103
Beginning January 1, 1992, and avary yaax tharaaftar tha fair markat ralua of
raaidantial property ahall ba raduead by 29.301, rapraaaatiag a raaidantial
axaaaption allovad andar Artiela XIII, Sac. 2, Otah Conatitution.
Beginning January 1, 1994, and arery yaar tharaaftar tha fair narkat ralna of
raaidantial proparty ihall ba raduead by 321, rapraaaatiag a raaidantial
•xaaaption allovad ondar Axtiola XXXI, M c . 2, Utah Conatitution.
Beginning June 1, 199S, tha fair aarkat ralua of raaidaatial proparty a hall
ba raduead by 43t,repreaenting a raaidantial exemption allowad andar Article
C X I , See. 2, Utah Conatitution.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A. E., INC., a Utah Corporation,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL

]
])

Civil No. 990600463PR

SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION; ;)
;
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT
'y
COUNTY ASSESSOR; and SUMMIT ;
COUNTY TREASURER,
;
Defendants/Appellees.

^ ^
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(Judge Robert K. Hilder)

]

1. Notice is hereby given that plaintiff/appellant, A. E., Inc., through counsel,
Milo S. Marsden, Jr., appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final order on the parties'
motions for summary judgment of the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, entered in this
matter on May 11, 2000.
2. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment, including but not limited to the
fact finding that plaintiff never filed an application or affidavit for residential property tax

exemption with Summit County, or that UCA Section 59-2-1102(3) applies to the
residential exemption.
This appeal is also taken from the court's conclusions of law as follows:
(1) It is not the province of the court to determine
whether or not, in fact, the exemption applies to the plaintiff,
for the court is not the taxing entity, rather, Summit County is
the taxing entity and it does the assessment and makes the
determination. Summit County's determination can then be
reviewed by the court after the payment of the tax under
protest. That's what the court reviews-whether Summit
County made the appropriate decision. The court should
abstain from being the initial decision maker, such actions
being outside the role of the judicial branch.
(2) UCA, Section 59-2-1102(3), as amended, and the
Utah State Tax Commission's standards of practice require an
application filed, under oath, setting forth facts upon which a
residential property tax exemption may be granted. That
application was not filed in this case for the tax years in
question.
(3) The presumption favoring the full-market value
taxation of real property was not overcome in the instant case
in the absence of the above-referenced application filing.
(4) A cause of action accrued to the plaintiff at the
moment he paid his tax under protest, and in each year they
were paid under protest, and the applicable statute of
limitations is four years from the date of a tax payment under
protest. Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab County, 62 P.
1024, (Utah 1900), U.C.A. §78-12-25.
ORDER
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court now hereby ORDERS,
ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
2

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted
as to all unlawful taxation claims for all years, no affidavit
having been filed for any of the years; and further, the statute
of limitations bars recovery for the claims from 1992 through
and including 1995, the causes of action accruing more than
four years before the filing of the complaint. Accordingly,
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied.
Further appeal is taken from the court docket which states:
Court finds that there are no material facts that Court
can examine as to whether the county is the entity to make
the decision. First, during the years 1992-1996, plaintiff did
not comply with the Utah State Tax Commission rules which
require that an affidavit must be filed when someone pays
their taxes under protest. Second, the statute of limitations
has run for the years 1992-1995. Court instructs that
although it is an option, once the taxes are paid under
protest, an action has to take place within four years. Court
further finds that the saving statute (78-12-40, Utah Code
Annotated), does not apply. The Utah State Tax
Commission requires that an affidavit be filed and none was
filed. The letter of protest is not an application; it is not
verified by oath. Therefore, Court grants defendant's motion
for summary judgment first on no affidavit and second on
statute of limitations.
DATED this 3 5 ! day of June, 2000.

lib S. Ms
MARSDE^C^HOONwGaTTFREDSON
& BELL, LLC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL this
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day of June, 2000, postage prepaid, to Robert W. Adkins, David L. Thomas, and David
G. Bayles, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128, Coalville, UT 84017.
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